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Abstract 
The following research paper deals with the current allocation of water in New Zealand. However, 
due to the legal background and the current practice of water allocation, some water crises have 
occured, as the current regulatory system in New Zealand has its oddities and flaws. The author will 
identify three major issues that will all have relevance for the question whether New Zealand should 
rather strengthen administrative processes or integrate more market elements in the regulatory regime 
of water. At the end, the author will conclude that a combined effort is desirable to achieve the best 
regulatory outcomes. 
Statement of word length (excluding the table of contents, footnotes and the bibliography): 
approximately 15 859 words 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Water is an essential part of human life and therefore, it 1s also of vital 
interest to a country to find the best regulatory scheme to deal with this valuable 
resource (II). 
Even a country that has such an abundance of water as New Zealand 1 faces problems 
with this most precious good human beings can own. This became clear in the 
Canterbury case, 2 where different usages of water opposed each other (III). The 
current regulatory framework (IV) as well as the nearly non-ex1stmg allocative 
approach for water in New Zealand3 (V) have their flaws . The author has chosen 
three main points of criticism that all have an influence on the question of in how far 
New Zealand should rely on an administrative or a market approach regarding water 
regulation. 
Regional regulators often do not receive sufficient guidance by national 
government, so that the question anses in how far and to what extent public 
authorities should be involved.4 
The most urgent problem, however, is the fact that it simply follows a "first-in [,) 
first-served"5 approach which disregards the principle of efficiency. 
Finally, Maori participation has been criticized as weak (Vl).6 
1 Ministry of Environment The State of New Zealand 's Environment J 997 (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 1997), as found in Kevin Counsel! Achieving Efficiency in Water 
Allocation (New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation 10 October 2003), 4 
2 "Troubled Water" (5 September 2003) The National Business Review (found without page indication 
in the database Newstext Magazines) 
3 Compare: Lincoln Environmental Water Allocmion: A strategic overview (Report No. 4455/1 , 
prepared by Christina Robb - in association with Simon Harris (Harris Consulting) and Ton Seider 
(NIWA) - for the Ministry for the Environment, May 2001 ), as found in Counsel! , Achieving 
Efficiency in Water Allocation., above n 1, 12 
See al so Ministry for the Environment Water Programme of Action, Warer Allocation and Use, 
Technical Working Paper (June 2004), 9 
~ Ministry for the E nvironment Report of the Sustainable Development, Water Programme of Action, 
Local Government Workshops (Jul y 2005) 5 
5 Counsel! , Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 12, with further reference to Lincoln 
Environmental Water Allocmion: A strategic oven 1iew, above n 3 
6 Ministry for the Environment Report of the Sustainable Develop111enr, Water Programme of Action, 
Local Government Workshops (July 2005), above n 4, 5 
5 
The author argues that the solution to these three issues is not white or black 
but grey, i.e. a regulatory mix that combines improved administrative processes with 
the implementation of market elements. 
These market elements could foster efficiency and contribute better to a sensible 
distribution of scarce resources in some pa11s of the country, 7 as the Australian 
context has shown. 8 The author argues that it will be necessary to modestly enhance 
market elements and to encourage the public to become involved in this approach 
(VII). 
However, market elements will only be a tool for some regions and some 
market participants in New Zealand. 9 Just as in Australia, 10 there will still remain an 
administrative approach, which is also necessary, due to the characteristics of 
water. 11 The author argues for slight reform processes m this context; the 
preponderance of local councils 12 should be assisted by better guidance by national 
government (VIII). 13 
Finally, markets will probably discriminate against Maori and their specific 
values that should be translated into western standards. Therefore, public 
involvement is necessary; for this, Western science has to be combined with the 
7 Compare in respect of an improved trading/model: Counsell, Achieving Efficiency i11 Water 
Allocation, above n 1, 18-19, with further reference - among others - to M. Thobani "Formal Water 
Markets: Why, When and How to Introduce Tractable Water Rights" (1997) 12 (2) The World Bank 
Research Observer, 161-179 
Also see: Lincoln Environmental Attitudes a11d Barriers to Water Transfer (Report Nr. 4464/1, 
rrepared for the Ministry for the Environment, 2001), 39 
Kevin Counsel! Methods for the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand 
(Thesis submitted to VUW for the fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of 
Commerce and Administration (Economics), Wellington, December 2004) 
28, with further reference to J. McKay and H. Bjornlund "Recent Australian market mechanisms as a 
component of an environmental policy that can make choices between sustainability and social 
justice" 14 (4) Social Justice Research, 387-403 
9 Lincoln Environmental Attitudes and Barriers to Water Transfer, above n 7, 39 
1° Counsell, Methods for the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New 
Zealand,above n 8, 27 
11 Arguing against too much private involvement: The European Commission Community Research 
Final Report for Work Package l (Phase 1) Analysis of the European Unions Explicit and Implicit 
Policies and Approaches in the Larger Water Sector (2003) 127 
12 Compare in respect of the benefits of a decentralized regulatory structure: Worldbank, Tool kits for 
Private Participation in Water and Sanitation, Toolkit 1, Annex 2 - Options for regulating water and 
sanitation, 3rd page <www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/water/wstoolkits/index.html> (last accessed 
11.02.06) 
The page relevant for this research paper was accessed via 
<www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/wstoolkits/Kitl/annex6.html> (last accessed 11.02.06). The relevant 
text was under the heading "How decentralized should regulation be?" 
13 Compare the wishes of great parts of the public as documented by Ministry for the Environment 
Reflections: A s11111111riry of your views on the Sustainable Water Progra111111e of Action (July 2005) 4 
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Mao1i culture, which could be achieved by closer cooperation between Pakeha and 
Maori (IX) . 14 
At the end, it wi II become clear that a combined effort seems to bring the best 
regulatory results . 
II THE GOOD "WATER" 
Water is a resource that has a paramount importance for human society. 
Therefore, it needs good regulation. Water plays an essential role in enabling life on 
thi s planet. Apart from that, it is a prerequisite for agriculture and industry and it is 
also a device used for the production of electricity. Water is often the desired 
environment for recreation and it has a preponderate intrinsic value for culture and 
h . h I is uman society as a w o e . 
The importance of water cannot be derived solely from the chemical formula 
H20; one has to become aware of the fact that it is the most basic resource for the 
human species . 16 An individual is estimated to survive about 3 weeks without 
nut1ition, but only about 3 days without water. Therefore, water has an outstanding 
importance for human societies, which will even increase in the next decades. A 
former World Bank Vice President said: "If the wars of this century were fought over 
oil , the wars of the next century will be fought over water". 17 
Water also has a spiritual significance, which becomes vital in New Zealand 
in respect of the belief of the Maori. Maori attach religious importance to water, as 
water establishes a link between the past and the present as well as between the earth 
and the sky so that it must be treated like a treasure that has to be handed over by our 
generation to the next in a good state.18 
14 Compare - in respect of one concrete project: Gail Tipa; Laure l Te irney A Cultural Health Index f or 
Streams and Waterways (Indicato rs for recognising and express ing Maori va lues, Report prepared for 
the Ministry for the Environment, June 2003) 50 
15 Counsel I Methods f or the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 1 
16 Counse ll , Methods fo r the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, I 
17 Ismail Serageldin , World Bank Vice Pres ident , 1995, as found in Counse l! AclziePing Effic iency in 
Water Allocatio11 , above n 1, l 
18 Ministry fo r the E nvironment Water Programm e of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Tech11ical 
Wo rki11g Paper (J une 2004), above n 3, 4 
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Due to this vital importance of water, politicians have said that water is 
"different from other commodities and that the government must allocate it" 19 on the 
one hand. But on the other hand, some held the opinion that " in fact the opposite is 
true; because it is so precious, we cannot afford the mi sallocation that comes from 
political control."20 
Others stress the limits of a market-orientated approach and point out the wider legal 
framework and prerequisites for functioning water regimes . 
"How they work is influenced by legal rules , political choices, institutional 
arrangements, economic and geographical conditions and cultural practices -
they are, in short, unavoidably complicated. For the same reasons they can 
never be 'neutral', automatic or self-regulating, as some of their proponents 
claim."2 1 
Anyway, water needs regulation. In many jurisdictions, water rights exist; to 
obtain such a right, every user has to apply for it to be granted to him or her. 22 
However, even this concept is not a matter of course. As the Canadian water activist 
Maude Barlow once asserted, " [w]ater must be declared and understood for all time 
to be the common property of all. No one has the right to appropriate for profit." 23 
Although these are leftist views, it at least becomes clear that the resource water is 
not a usual good, such as a car or so. Put in plain words, if someone does not have a 
car, for instance, he or she can walk or make use of public transportation. If a 
community has problems with electricity, especially developed countries which 
normally rely heavily on these devices will have serious problems, some people 
might even die, but a chance of survival exists. In contrast, if someone is without 
water for about three days, he or she will inevitably die due to this fact. 
Water has many characteristics of a public good, which means that its social 
benefit outweighs the private benefits . The question is: "Who should regulate the 
water?" It can be said that up till now, there is a heavy reliance on public auth01ities , 
19 T . Anderson; P . Snyder "Priming the Invisible Pump" PERC PolicySeries 1997 Issue Number PS -
9 (who di ssent with thi s opinion), as found in Colin McLell an Water Allocation in New Zealand A 
role f or rrading water permits (VUW Thesis, Wellington, December 1998) 3 
20 Anderson; Snyder, above n, as found in McLellan, abo ve n 19, 3 
21 C.J . Bauer ,,Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth : The Po litica l Economic o f Water Rights in 
Chile, 1976-95" World Development 25(5), 639,652 , as found in McLellan , above n 19 , 3 
22 Counse ll , Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocarion, above n 1, 25 
23 Maude Barlow, as quoted by Richard Tren "Water is not 'different '", 
<http ://www.techcentral stati on.com/ l 20903D.html> (last accessed 31.01 .06) 
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as it is often held that public authorities have a greater understanding than consumers 
of the aspect of clean water and its importance for society as a whole. 24 
In general terms, two distinct ways exist how water allocation is handled. 
One is administrative allocation; here, a public agency deals with the matter of 
al location. 
The second 1s markets on which users can transfer water rights. Markets can be 
described by free decisions of market participants, who can set priorities and try to 
achieve their personal goals.25 
Most allocation markets on the planet form part of a continuum on the scale between 
administrative allocation on the one hand and market allocation on the other hand. 
Whereas New Zealand and England rely heavily on the administrative approach, 
Australia can be placed in the middle, while Chile is known for its dominance of 
water markets. 26 
The way water is currently regulated in New Zealand, especially in the field of 
allocation, has to do with the peculiar characteristics of New Zealand's environment. 
The author of the research paper argues that in the context of New Zealand, it 
is not a black or white solution that will contribute best to an efficient and sustainable 
use of water, which also protects Maori values, but a grey solution, a combination of 
public regulation with market elements. In this concept, special importance has to be 
attached to the aspect of Maori values,27 which has to be reflected in the regulatory 
structure. As the author argues, this could be achieved by a special agency28 for the 
protection of Maori values. 
A market approach could be applied in some areas in New Zealand. 29 It could be 
combined with regional authorities, regulating water at a local level, 30 whereas, at a 
24 The European Commission Community Research, above n 11, 124 
25 Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 25, with further reference to J. 
McMillan Reinventing the Bazaar: A natural history of markets (W.W. Norton and Company, New 
York, 2002) 
26 Counsel!, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 25-26 
27 Compare Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 50 
28 Compare in general terms in respect of the agency solution: Robert Baldwin ; Martin Cave 
Understanding Regularion - Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 
69-70 
29 Lincoln Environmental Attitudes and Barriers to Water Transfer, above n 7, 39 
3° Compare in respect of the benefits of a decentralized regulatory structure: Worldbank, above n 12, 
Annex 2, 3rd page, found under the heading "How decentralized should regulation be?" 
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national level , the agency for Maori concerns could be installed and, additionally, 
further guidance could be given to local entities. 31 
Anyway, a regulatory change in New Zealand 1s necessary, due to the growing 
problems in New Zealand ' s water allocation 
Ill PROBLEMS WITH NEW ZEALAND'S WATER ALLOCATION 
Due to New Zealand's abundance of water resources, the allocation of these 
"has never been a high priority" . 32 An analysis of the natural conditions of New 
Zealand might be helpful in this context. 
A Natural Conditions in New Zealand 
New Zealand - as an island nation - is autonomous in the way that it largely 
relies on its own water resources . As no rivers can deliver the important water, 
precipitation and natural aquifers are the only two big sources of water supply. 
Therefore, these water resources have to be protected, especially as climate changes 
will have a greater impact.33 
New Zealand, however, can rely on a great amount of rainfall , adding up to 
an estimated figure between 300 and 600 billion cubic metres per year. 34 For 
purposes of analysis, it is necessary to become aware of the fact that this rainfall is 
unevenly spread, both in a temporal and a geographical dimension. In the course of a 
year, the amount of rainfall varies, so that droughts occur in some parts of the 
country, whereas in other seasons floods occur. Furthermore, whereas some regions 
are very dry, for instance Central Otago, with a rainfall of about 350 mm per year, 
3 1 Compare the wishes of great parts of the public as documented by Ministry fo r the Environment 
Refl ections: A summary of your views on the Sustainable Water Programme of Action (July 2005), 
aboven 13, 4 
32 Counsel! , Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 2 
33 Molly W alsh; Alex Belinky ; Brian Goebe l, Globalchange, Chapter 4, Ire land and New Zeland , 
Water Resources, 
<http://www.globalchange.umich.edu/globalchange3/current/students/ire land_ nz/water_ report.htm> 
(las t accessed 3 1.01.06), introducti on 
34 Ministry of E nviro nment The Stare of New Zealand 's En vironment J 997 (Ministry fo r the 
Environment , Wellington, 1997), as found in Counsel!, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, 
above n I. 4 
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other areas receive abundant rainfall, e.g. Westland with an average rainfall of more 
than 6,000 mm. 35 
The rainfall is stored in surface water, such as the 70 major rivers, over 770 
lakes and wetland and the huge number of groundwater deposits. What makes New 
Zealand so special in this context is the fact that often a large number of small 
autonomous catchments exists that do not have major connections to others. 
Countries such as Australia or the Western United States rely on large rivers with 
often one big catchment area. 
Rivers and Lakes deliver about 60 percent of the water which is consumed in New 
Zealand; the rest comes from groundwater resources.36 
The water New Zealand receives is an input for several activities. The most 
important sector water is needed for is hydro-electric generation, with over 100 
billion cubic metres annually. 37 
Other uses cover recreational and environmental matters, for instance for the 
preservation of the flora and fauna. Apart from that, some lakes, rivers and wetlands 
form an integral part of national parks.38 
Up to 2 billion cubic metres a year are used for consumption - excluding hydro-
electric generation. Irrigation, household uses and industrial consumption play an 
important role in this. Irrigation, however, is the dominant sub-group of these uses, 
amounting to about 57 percent. 39 Other sources even speak of about 77 percent in 
this context.40 
35 Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 4 
36 Ministry of Environment, The State of New Zealand's Environment 1997, above n 34, as found in 
Counsel!, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 4 
37 Statistics New Zealand in New Zealand Official Yearbook 2002 (Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2002), as found in Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 4-5 
38 Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 5 
39 Statistics New Zealand, above n, as found in Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, 
above n 1, 5 
40 Lincoln Environmental .. Information on Water Allocation in New Zealand", Report Nr. 4375/1, 
2000, prepared for the Ministry of the Environment, as found in Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in 
Water A/location, above n 1, 5 
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B Water Crises as Causes for Regulatory Reform 
I Water crises 
Given the fact that New Zealand - overall - has an abundance of the natural 
resource of water, it seems - at first glance - to be surprising that there should be any 
need for reform. 
As one commentator said, New Zealand has "a lot of the stuff'41 . New Zealand is -
in respect of the water available per person - second only to Norway and has 40 
times more than in China.42 
However, an improvement of regulation is not only possible, but also necessary. 
The population in some parts of New Zealand is growing and competition between 
the conflicting uses of water arises. Considering the fact that some areas of New 
Zealand rely on water in times when it is scarce, a re-assessment of water allocation 
has become a major issue on the agenda of the regulators.43 
But why was this the case? The stimulus for the new debate on reforming 
water regulation was some major crises that have illustrated the problem of water 
allocation in New Zealand. One can think of the Auckland water crisis in 1994, the 
drought period of Marlborough in 2001, the crisis in hydro power production due to 
low lake inflows in 2001 and 2003, the water scarcity on the Kapiti Coast in 2003 
and the conflict in South Canterbury in respect of the Waitaki river, where irrigation 
and hydro-electric usage opposed each other.44 
The last case shall be illustrated in more detail. In his famous mov1e 
Chinatown, Roman Polanski "wove a tale of co1Tuption and skulduggery around the 
acquisition of water 1ights in the arid San Fernando Valley near Los Angeles."45 
The plot is partly based on events that happened in California in the 1900s, 
where a battle took place between ordinary citizens and businessmen involved in 
41 Rod Oram "Out of our depth and sinking" (9 October 2005), <www.waternz.co.nz> (last accessed 
31.01.06> 
42 Oram, above n 41 
43 Compare: Oram, above n 41 
44 Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 2 
45 "Troubled Water'' , above n 2 
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land development plans. In the Waitaki Valley, situated between Canterbury and 
Otago, another battle took place - definitely a legal one, without any reported crimes 
(as was the case in Polanski's movie).46 
But who are the actors in this real world plot? 
On the one hand, there is Meridian Energy, a state-owned power company that itself 
owns the Manapouri power station and is responsible for the Waitaki scheme. This 
company can make use of large water resources in the Upper Waitaki catchment, 
where around 40 percent of the country's electricity is produced.47 
The problem arose when Meridian wanted to draw up the 1,2 billion project with the 
title "Project Aqua"48 , that provided that more water should be taken from the lower 
Waitaki River and around two-thirds of the river's water should be diverted into a 
canal to generate even more electricity with the help of six additional power stations, 
thereby delivering an additional 8 percent of the country's energy.49 
On the other hand, there are the farmers, represented by interest groups and 
claiming water themselves. Farmers intend to make use of the same water for the 
purpose of irrigating pastures and crops in South Canterbury and North Otago - the 
two major cities that are separated from each other by the Waitaki Valley. The 
problem was aggravated by the fact that farmers had converted land uses from low 
water-consuming grazing land use to more intensive uses, such as cropping. Despite 
Meridian's offer to settle this dispute, namely to grant 43 Million Dollars for a new 
irrigation scheme that could provide water for around 40 OOO ha of land in the region 
of North Otago, the dispute still went on.50 
All in all, Project Aqua was regarded as "New Zealand's first major clash 
between competing interests wanting to get their hands on the same water".51 
In the end, around 40 resource consent applications lay on the table of the 
responsible regional council. Under normal circumstances, the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) 1991 provides in these cases that applications are to be 
46"Troubled Water", above n 2 
47 'Troubled Water". above n 2 
48 "Troubled Water". above n 2 
49 "Troubled Water" . above n 2 
50 'Troubled Water··. above n 2 
51 'Troubled Water··. above n 2 
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served according to the "first-come" 52 principle. However, what the national 
government did was to bypass the normal RMA-procedure and to establish a special 
panel , appointed by the government. However, thi s intervention was regarded 
sceptically, especially by the side of irrigation proponents, who feared that 
governmental interests could interfere in the deci sion-making process.53 
Actually, central government had to intervene, as Environment Canterbury 
simply did not draw up an allocation plan in the past decades. 54 
After the first plan "fulfilled Meridian ' s worst fears"55 , requiring them "to double the 
minimum flow of water it was sending downriver"56 , in the end, a modified plan was 
drafted, which was met with the general acceptance of the parties involved.57 
Therefore, this case made everyone aware of the fact that water is "a scarce 
asset" 58 and that "Project Aqua has brought some issues to a head - particularly 
issues regarding national interests versus local interests."59 
Finally, discussions arose about a remodification of water allocation . These 
water crises have not only gained the attention of the media and rai sed general 
concern about the current legal framework of water allocation , but they have also 
made analysts aware of the fact that the current legal allocation system has been 
developed in times when "scarcity of water" was a forei gn term in New Zealand. 
Politicians, obviously consulted by water experts, have realized that in a comparative 
perspective, growth in New Zealand has gone very quickly and that the current water 
regulatory scheme has not kept pace with thi s development.60 
52 'Troubled Water", above n 2 
53 "T ro ubled Water", above n 2 
s-1 Oram, above n 41 
55 Oram, above n 41 
56 Oram , above n 41 
57 Oram, above n 4 1 
58 Sue Powell (fro m the Mini stry of the Environment), as quoted in ·Troubled Water" , above n 2 
59 Sue Powell , as quoted in "Troubled Water··. above n 2 
60 Ministry fo r the Environ ment Warer Programme of Action Water, A /locario11 and Use, Technica l 
Wo rki11g Paper (June 2004), above n. 6 
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2 The driving forces of the reform 
In order to understand the reform process better, it is important to know who 
originally began the debate about reforming water. To some degree, this is 
speculation , but the author of this paper is inclined to claim that politicians, who 
naturally want to be re-elected, became aware of the fact that the media transported 
certain messages when reporting about cases such as the Waitak.i case. Whereas in 
this event, a kind of "David-and-Goliath clash as one between national and local 
priorities"61 was detailed, in others it simply seemed to be possible that cities such as 
Dunedin were "drying out" 62 and people did not have sufficient water to use for 
ordinary purposes. These messages could have become very dangerous for the MPs 
in New Zealand, as water affects the most basic human instinct, namely the instinct 
to live. Therefore, water allocation is a "hot potato [ . .. which brings] people ' s 
emotions to the boil" .63 
The best way for politicians to get out of this dilemma consisted of accepting 
the fact that more and more debates about recent water problems were going on and 
to consult different interest groups - the public - about their views. One of the most 
important interest group is farmers, as around 77 percent of all water is allocated and 
used for agriculture,64 so that the author of this paper is inclined to see them as major 
driving force for recent developments. 
All in all , the New Zealand Government establi shed a project, the 
"Sustainable Water Programme of Action" 65 in 2003 in order to make sure that "the 
country ' s freshwater resources are managed to best suppo11 New Zealand ' s future 
sustainable development" .66 
61 "T ro ubled Water", above n 2 
62 
Steve Hepburn "Restraint in water use urged" ( 11 .11 .05),www.waternz.co. nz (last accessed 
31.01.06) 
63 Jim S utton "Water manage me nt is a ho t potato" Rural News (2 September 2002) 
6-l Sutton, above n 63 
65 Mini stry fo r the E nvironme nt Reflections: A su111111a r;1 of your Fiews 0 11 th e Susta inable Water 
Programme of Action (J ul y 2005), above n 13, I 
66 Ministry fo r the E nvironme nt Reflections: A summa ry of your vie11·s 0 11 the Susta inable Water 
Progra 111111e of Action (J ul y 2005), above n 13, I 
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It is a crucial point to "de-politicise the issue"67 and to work on the project of 
water reform m a foreseeable time-scale, which - as a commentator said - was 
"unlikely" 68 , as in New Zealand's politics, blood flows thicker and faster than 
water."69 
3 The "[s]ustainable [w]ater [p]rogramme of [a]ction " 70 
This program was one element of the Government's "Sustainable 
Development Programme of Action". 7 1 This project started with working groups 
whose task was to analyse three major areas, namely water allocation and use, water 
quality and the identification of water bodies of national importance. These working 
groups released three technical papers in July 2004, namely "Water allocation and 
use"72 , "The effects of rural land use on water quality"73 and "Potential water bodies 
f . l . ,, 74 o nat1ona importance . 
On the basis of these three maJor papers , a public discussion document was 
developed and the three topics were dealt with in an integrated manner. Eight key 
issues of water regulation were identified and proposals were made to find solutions 
to the major problems of water resources.75 These key issues included the criticism 
of a lack of "strategic planning approach",76 failures in the water allocation process 
and concerns about the unsatisfactory Maori participation in this approach. As 
discussing all eight key issues would go beyond the scope of this research paper, the 
three aspects mentioned will form the main part of the following analysis.77 
67 Oram, above n 41 
68 Oram, above n 41 
69 Oram, abo ve n 41 
70 Mini stry for the Environment Refl ecrions: A summary of your views 011 rlze Susrainable Warer 
Programme of A crio11 (July 2005), abo ve n 13 , l 
7 1 Mini stry for the Enviro nment Reflections: A s11111mary of your views 011 1/ze Sustainable Water 
Progra111me of A c1io11 (July 2005), abo ve n 13, l 
72 Ministry for the Environment Reflecrio11 s: A summary of your l' iews 011 r/ze Susrai11able Ware r 
Programme of A ction (Jul y 2005 ), above n 13, I 
73 Mini stry for the E nvironment Reflecrions: A summary of your l' iews 011 rh e Susrai11able Water 
Programme of A crio 11 (July 2005), above n 13, l 
7
"' Minis try for the Envi ro nment Refl ecrions: A summary of your views 011 rhe Sustainable Water 
Programme of A c1io 11 (July 2005 ), above n 13, l 
75 Ministry fo r the E nviro nment Refl ections: A s11111111ary of your views on rh e Sustainable Warer 
Prog ra111111 e of A c1ion (Jul y 2005), above n 13, I 
76 Counse l! , Achieving Effic iency in Wmer A llocation , above n 1, 8 
77 Mini s try for the En vironment Rejlec1ions: A summary of your views 011 the Sustainable Water 
Prog ram111 e ofA ctio 11 (Jul y 2005), above n 13, 4-7 
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The discussion document was published on 14 December 2004 and was the 
reference and starting-point for a consultation process that began in February 2005. 
Meetings took place in 20 locations all over New Zealand in order " to hear what 
New Zealanders had to say about freshwater management." 78 In the end, this 
consultation process showed that - generally - the public shared the issues already 
presented by the government. However, additional topics were addressed, for 
instance bio security and health aspects as well as an integrated management 
approach. 79 
In order to sum up this process and to place it in a wider context, the available 
reform options range from a general change of the regime of regulation to slight 
changes in the current legal and economical framework . Two major and 
groundbreaking issues may illustrate this. 
First of all , a general question has to be answered with respect to the aspect of 
who should govern water distribution. The responsible institutions can be markets, 
where offer and demand interplay and govern the way water is dealt with , or political 
decision-makers , that prescribe how water should be handled. In practical terms, 
there is often a mixture of both.80 
Secondly, the vehicle to allocate and distribute water resources is property 
rights, which are legal claims to make use of the water and to enjoy the benefits of its 
use. 81 
For the decision of how to handle water, the international perspective has 
become more and more important. Practical experiences in other countries have 
shown first-hand efforts ,82 undergone by other states working as pioneers in some 
areas, which are analyzed and provide valuable clues as to which regimes tum out to 
be more successful than others . It is clear that economic theories are an important 
78 
Ministry for the En vironment Refl ections: A summary of your views 0 11 the Sustainable Water 
Prog ramme of Action (J ul y 2005), above n 13, 2 
79 Ministry for the E nvironment Refl ections: A s11111111a ry of your l'iews 0 11 the Sustainable Water 
Prog ramme of Action (Jul y 2005), above n 13, 3, 7 
8° Counsell , Achieving Efficiency in Water A llocation , above n 1, 3 
81 Counsell , Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation , above n 1, 3 
82 Counsell , Achieving Efficiency in War er Allocation , above n I , 25 
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tool; however, they have to be applied in practical terms, which may be different in 
each state, environment and legal framework. 
IV THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A The Way towards the RMA - an Integrated Approach 
The current legislative framework has developed through a number of 
inconsistent statutes, namely the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (WSCA) and 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 (TCPA) and culminated in the passing of 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). 
Whereas the WSCA established water rights that were granted on an individual 
consideration of benefits and drawbacks without providing a consistent policy,83 the 
TCPA directly affected the land use and only had mediate consequences for water 
regulation. 84 
The RMA integrated these different regimes into one major law. It promoted 
decentralised decisions, the individual players on the stage - local governments as 
well as companies - being the decision-makers so that a national consensus on the 
matter of regulation is not mandatory. 85 
The purported goal of the RMA is "to promote the sustainable management 
of natural and physical resources" 86 . As the Act itself says, "sustainable" 87 
management covers "managing the use, development and protection of natural 
resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for 
their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety"88. 
At the same time, it has to sustain " the potential of natural and physical 
resources [ ... ] to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations"89 and 
3 Mclellan, above n 19, 7 
84 Mclellan, above n 19, 7 
85 Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Wat er Allocarion, above n 1, 6; Mclellan, above n 19, 7 
86 Section 5 RMA 1991 
87 Section 5 RMA 199 J 
88 Section 5 RMA 1991 
89 Section 5 (a) RMA J 991 
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to "safeguard[ ... ] the life-supporting capac ity of air, water, soil , and ecosystems."90 
It relies on the principle of " [a]voiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse 
effects" .9 1 All in all , the RMA first focuses on the activities , analyses their effects 
and puts forward the idea of reducing or eliminating these harmful consequences.92 
This act is governed by three major principles. 
Firstly, according to section 6, " matters of national importance"93 have to be taken 
into account, the "natural character", 94 the " indigenous vegetation" 95 and peculiar 
matters of the Maori 96 being of utmost importance. 
S ' ] h " 97 . . I f ection 7 mentions ' [o t er matters , giving a ist o them, e.g. the matter of 
efficiency, 98 the " [I]ntrinsic values of ecosystems" 99 and the environment as a 
whole 100 are mentioned. 
Finally, section 8 refers to the Treaty of Waitangi , which has to be regarded in the 
d · · ki 101 ec1s1on-ma ng process. 
B The Authorities 
In respect of organization the RMA provides a framework which favours 
d I. d d . . ki I 02 ecentra 1ze ec1s10n-ma ng. 
The paramount responsibility for water allocation - in the hierarchical order of 
authorities (with the Minister for the Environment at the top and the districts and city 
councils at the bottom) 103 - is exercised by the regional councils and unitary 
authorities . 
90 Section 5 (b) RMA 1991 
91 Section 5 (c) RMA 1991 
92 Counsell , Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation , above n 1, 6 
93 Section 6 RMA 1991 
94 Section 6 (a) RMA 199 1 
95 Section 6 (c)RMA 1991 
96 Compare sec ti on 6 (e) RMA 199 1 
97 Heading o f Secti on 7 RMA 199 1 
98 Compare section 7 (b) RMA 199 1 
99 Sec ti on 7(d) RMA 199 1 
100 Section 7 (f) RMA 1991 
101 
Compare Counsel I, Methods f or rlze Allocarion and Va/11ario11 of War er Property Rights in New 
Zealand, above n 8, 10 
102 Kevin Counsel I Methods fo r th e Allocation and Va luation of Water Property Rights in New 
Zealand , above n 8, 9 
Also compare part 4, sections 24 -42 A RM A 199 1 
101 Counsell , Methods fo r the Allocation and Va luation of Wa ter Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 11 
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At a national level, the Ministry for the Environment and the Department of 
Conservation are concerned with the management of the RMA. Whereas the 
Department is only important in respect of New Zealand's coastal regions, the 
Ministry theoretically plays a vital role with regard to the release of national policy 
statements and national environmental standards when a matter of national 
significance is affected. However, in practical terms, the Department has not often 
d f h. h · 10-l ma e use o t 1s aut onty. 
The decisive role is att1ibuted to the 12 regional councils and 4 unitary 
authorities. These regional councils or unitary authorities respectively - the latter can 
be found in those regions where no regional councils exist and which have a double 
function, comprising the competences of the regional councils as well as those of the 
local district or city councils - have broad competences in respect of the management 
10-of the major water catchments. ) 
Section 30 of the RMA assigns them the function of "the establishment , 
implementation, and review of objectives, policies and methods to achieve integrated 
management of the natural and physical resources of the region", the "control of the 
taking, use, damming, and diversion of water, and the control of the quantity, level , 
and flow of water in any water body" and finally the "control of discharges into or 
onto land, air, or water and discharges of water into water." 106 
Apart from regional policy statements 107 , they can prepare regional plans 
where objectives, policies and methods are laid down, determining the distribution of 
water resources. 108 For instance, minimum flows for surface water as well as 
minimum levels of groundwater can be specified. 109 Additionally, other components 
are finalized, including allocation limits , rations of water for times of scarcity and the 
. f . h d 11 0 options o water ng ts tra es . 
104 Counsel!, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 7-8 
105 Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 7-8 
106 Also see McLellan, above n 19. 9-10 
107 Compare Counsel!, Methods for the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New 
Zealand, above n 8, 11 
108 Section 30 (la) RMA 1991 
109 Section 30 (le) RMA 1991 
11° Counsel!, Achieving Efficiency in Wmer Allocation, above n 1, 11 -12 
20 
At the lowest level , there are the di strict and city councils. 111 
C The "{Sjtrategic [P]lanning [A]pproach"112 of the RMA 
This approach consists of a senes of tools, which, on the whole, enable 
measures for the purpose of water regulation . They comprise plans and policy 
statements, resource consents and, finally , enforcement mechanisms. 
1 Plans and policy statements 
Starting with the plans and policy statements, one must take note of the fact 
that they are arranged in a hierarchical order, where those at the bottom must be 
complementary to those at the top. 
However, the top, namely the Minister for Environment, who can release national 
environmental standards and national policy statements, does not play a significant 
1 . . l 11 3 roe m pract1ca terms. 
Regional policy statements must be issued by all councils. They provide a 
concise summary of the natural and physical resource aspects in the region. 
Additionally and volunta1ily, the councils can - they do not have to - also issue 
regional plans. These plans reflect the goals and measures applicable to govern the 
region 's water management. These plans also have to be in compliance with regional 
policy statements. 
Finally, district plans are mandato1ily issued by the district and city councils which 
describe the aims and methods for water management at a local level. 114 
2 Enforcement mechanisms 
They are only a minor tool in the context of the RMA and comprise notices, 
declaring an abatement and infringement, to make sure that specific uses of water 
comply with the RMA. 115 
111 Counse ll , Achieving Efficiency in Wa1 er Allocarion , above n 1, 7-8 
112 Counsell , Achieving Efficiency i11 Wm er Allocation, above n 1, 8 
113 Counsel I, AclzieFing Efficiency in Waler Alloca1io11 , above n 1, 8 
114 Counsell , AchieFing Efficiency in Wal er Alloca1ion, above n 1. 8 
115 Counsell , Ac/1ie,•ing Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n I, 9 
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3 Resource consents 
Generally, a person may only "take, use, dam or divert any water" 116 if this 1s 
allowed by "a rule in regional plan [ ... ]or a resource consent" 117. 
A resource consent is a permit under the regime of the RMA, which is 
necessary to make use of natural resources. When these consents affect water, they 
are called water permits and released by regional councils and unitary authorities. 
Regional plans normally subdivide these activities involving the use of water into 
five classes. 118 They range from permitted activities with minor detrimental 
consequences, which do not even require a resource consent, to - for instance -
discretionary activities, where the regional councils have wide discretion whether to 
grant a permit, to refuse it totally or to add conditions to the permit. 
When a regional plan does not say anything about an activity, it 1s unclassified, 
which is then equal to a discretionary activity. 119 
In practical terms, a resource consent is necessary to undertake measures that 
have effects on the natural environment. When this involves the taking of only a 
small amout of water - 10 to 20 m3 per day - councils regard them as permitted 
activities that do not need a consent. When this threshold is crossed, activities are 
often classified as discretionary, meaning the councils have wide scope in their 
assessment and the way they consent. 120 
116 Section 14 (la) RMA 1991 
117 Section 14 (3a) RMA 1991, in connection with sec tion 14 (la) RMA. The other exceptions in 
section 14 (3b) - (3e) RMA do not have any relevance for the purpose of thi s analysis. 
See also: Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Warer Allocation, above n 1, 12 
The RMA classifies the activities in several classes, ranging from permitted activities (that do not 
require any consent) to prohibited activities (which are strictly interdicted). 
Section 77 (b) RMA 1991. 
Also compare Colin McLellan , above n 19. 12 
11 8 Section 77 (b) RMA 1991 
Also see: Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 9 
119 McLellan,aboven 19, 12 
Also see section 77 (b) RMA 1991 
120 Counsel I, Achie1•i11g Efficiency in Wm er Allorntio11, above n I , 9 
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4 The application process 
The process starts with consultations between the applicant, the council staff 
and third parties that might have an interest, followed by preparatory works. They 
include an assessment of the real and potential effects of the activity and the options 
of the applicant to avoid or at least mitigate them. When the activity is detailed, an 
application can be launched. 121 
The council now has to decide whether to consent to the activity and whether 
to notify the public. This enables the public to issue objections to the consent. The 
first possibility for this is the hearing, where the public - according to section 96 
RMA "anyone" 122 - can make submissions. The final decision regarding the consent, 
made by the hearing panel, can be appealed to the Environment Court. 123 All in all, 
this process has been attacked as being too complex, too long and a process which is 
"bogged down in objections". 124 
The RMA Amendment Act of 2003 sought to bring relief to some of these 
flaws. It involved changes to the notification in the area of such activities which 
involve only minor detrimental effects. A comprehensive public notification is no 
longer necessary and can be replaced by a process in which only directly effected 
parties are notified. Furthermore, this Act allows the authorities to consider certain 
effects on a case basis and allows them to disregard them, so they gain more 
flexibility in assessing an application. 125 
A further step was the Resource Management Act 2005, attempting to 
facilitate and speed up the application process. Three of the amendments shall be 
introduced in this context. 
121 Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n l, 10 
122 Section 96 RMA 1991 
121 Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Wmer Allocation, above n I , 9-10 
124 R. Kerr "The Resource Management Act: Fundamentally Sound or Fundamentally Flawed", a 
speech to the Massey University Planning Program 2002. as found in Counsell, Achieving Efficiency 
in Water Allocation, above n I, 9-10 
125 Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation , above n I, I 0-11 
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Firstly, the importance of pre-hearing meetings is strengthened. Councils can now 
prescribe attendance at these. If a person does not fulfi I thi s requirement, his 
submi ssion can be declined, as stated in section 99 (5) RMA.126 
Secondly, section 99 (A) RMA states that mediation can be contracted between the 
parties. It could help them to distil! their real desires and interests - not their 
positions 
127 
- and to come to negotiated solutions which might correspond better to 
their wishes. 128 
Finally, the time for decision-making by the Environment Court was shortened. 
Now , hea1ing dates can take place within 6 months. Furthermore, the Court can take 
evidence in a written form and can consider those media of proof that were already 
brought to the consent authority, section 290 (A) RMA. 129 
The author of this paper is convinced that the lengthy application processes 
are not the main problem of the current regulatory approach. It is crucial for a good 
regulatory scheme to involve public auth01ities in the allocation of water. This will 
often take time, which is necessary for good decisions in some cases. It definitely is a 
step in the right direction to speed up these processes to a reasonable degree, 
maintaining a high quality of decision-making. But all this should not dilute the fact 
that the most urgent problems are different from mere long-term application 
processes. 
126 
Minis try fo r the E nvironment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving decision 
making (August 2005), as found under the heading "Pre-hearing meetings" 
127 
The autho r of thi s paper can refer to a course he atte nded as part of hi s profess io nal lega l training, 
prov ided by the state of Bavaria. The course - he ld by Robert Rost and Peter Guenter - had the title 
"Muenchener Workshop zum Verhandlungs manage me nt", where thi s important d ifference was 
eva luated . 
Compare the articl e of a fo rmer co lleague o f the autho r, who also atte nded thi s workshop: 
Thi lo Schul z, Verhandlungsfaehigkeit - E ine Schluesselqualifikati on, 
<http://www.jurawe lt. com/referendare/ra-beru f/7904> (l ast accessed 31.01.06), with further 
references at the end of his article, among others to Fritjof Haft Verlzandlung und Mediation. Die 
Alternari, •e -:::. 11111 Rechtsstreit (CH.Beck, 2000) 
128 
Mini stry fo r the E nviro nment Resource Manage111ent Amendment Act 2005 - Improving decision 
making (A ugust 2005), above n 126, fo und under the heading "Mediati on" 
129 
Minis try fo r the E nviro nment Resource Man agement Amendme111 Act 2005 - Improving decision 
making (August 2005), above n 126, fo und under the heading "Improv ing dec is ion making at the 
E nviro nme nt Court" 
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D Features of the Water Permit 
Once a water permit is gained, it can be seen - in legal terms - as a right of 
action , allowing to take, make use or divert water, under the maxim that water 
factually is available. However, it does not create legal ownership or some sort of 
property rights in the technical sense and, moreover, it does not give a guarantee that 
water still exists in sufficient quantities. 
Furthermore, they can be granted up to 35 years or - if nothing else is provided - for 
five years, according to section 126 of the RMA.130 
What is also of importance in this context is the fact that, once a permit is 
issued, it will not exist for an unlimited period of time. Sections 125 and 126 of the 
RMA contain the so-called "use it or lose it provisions" 131. 
According to section 125 RMA, a consent lapses after 2 years after the 
commencement of the consent, unless another provision exists in the consent. 
Finally, section 126 RMA deals with the cancellation of consent, which allows 
auth01ities to cancel the consent if "it has not been exercised for a continuous period 
of 2 years" . 132 
E Transfer of Water Permits 
Once a water permit is issued, it is not - for all times - attached to the 
original applicant, but can be transferred to other users. 
Section 136 of the RMA differentiates in this context: 
A holder of a water permit granted for damming or diverting water may transfer it to 
any owner or occupier of the affected site. 
Holders of water permits for other activities may grant it - at their discretion - to any 
owner or occupier of the site. 
130 Al so see: Ministry fo r the E nviro nment , Wmer Allocc11ion and Use, Technica l Working Paper 
(June 2004), above n 3. 8 
13 1 McLellan, above n 19, 12 
rn McLe ll an, abovc n 19, 12- 13 
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If they want to transfer it to other persons, this is only possible if the other person is 
in the same area of catchment, aquifer or geothermal field and the transfer has been 
approved - either generally in the regional plan or individually by the authorities. 133 
Thereby, tradable water pe1mits are one of the economic tools of the RMA 
which are declared to be a medium to achieve the purpose of the Act, as section 24 
(h) of the RMA provides. However, the RMA itself limits the use of economic 
instruments by stating that only the permit holders have to be charged with the costs 
that arise. A charge by economic value or an allocation by auction is not provided in 
the RMA.134 
V METHODS OF ALLOCATION 
In respect of the organization, the RMA provides a framework which favours 
d 1. d d . . k" 135 ecentra 1ze ec1s1on-ma mg. 
The paramount responsibility for water allocation - in the hierarchical order of 
authorities (with the Mini ster for the Environment at the top and the districts and city 
councils at the bottom) 136 - is exercised by the regional councils and unitary 
authorities. Apart from regional policy statements 137 , they can prepare regional plans 
where objectives , policies and methods are laid down , determining the dist1ibution of 
water resources. 138 For instance, minimum flows for surface water as well as 
minimum levels of groundwater can be specified. 139 Additionally, other components 
are finalized, including allocation limits, rations of water for times of scarcity and the 
. f . h d 140 options o water ng ts tra es. 
133 Al so see: Mclellan, above n 19, 13- 15 
134 Mcl ellan, above n 19, 14- 15 
135 Counsell Methods f or the Alloca1io11 and Va luation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 9 
Al so compare part 4, sections 24 -42 A RM A 199 1 
136 Counsell , Methods fo r the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 11 
137 Compare Counsell , Methods.for the Allocation and Va luation of Wa ter Property Rights in New 
Zealand, above n 8, 11 
138 Section 30 ( 1 a) RMA 199 1 
139 Sec tion 30 ( J e) RM A 199 1 
14° Counsell , Achieving Effic ie11 c1· in Wa ter Allocation, above n I, 11 - 12 
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The underlying principle for all this 1s the "sustainable development of 
natural and physical resources" . 14 1 
When issuing a resource consent, applications are compared with the goals of 
the regional plans and it is assessed whether the desired activity complies with them. 
In doing this , any potential harm to environment is scrutinized. 142 
The crucial aspect of allocation is , however, that despite these theoretically sensible 
parameters, authotities often act on the basis of priority so that the first applicant will 
receive the first resource consent, which often causes the situation of a "gold 
rush". 143 
It is important to become aware of the fact that the RMA demands persons 
managing environmental resources to make efficient use of them, section 7 (b) RMA. 
However, in practical terms, councils do take efficiency into account but with the 
perspective of the individual user and the applied technical efficiency but not at the 
level of allotment of the resource as a whole within the pool of potential users.144 
The applicants that came last and were therefore not served are sometimes put on a 
waiting list. In times of scarcity, rationing schemes are most often applied to reduce 
the taking of water from the resources . Here, ce1tain uses are preferred, for instance 
domestic water and fire-fighting water. 145 
Trading of water could be a solution and a maJor prov1s1on exists m the 
RMA, section 136 RMA, requiring that the transfer takes place between users of the 
same catchment, aquifer or geothermal field and, additionally, the transfer was 
provided in the regional pl an and consented by the council. However, up till now, 
there are not many practical examples of water trades.146 
141 Secti on 5 RMA 1991 
142 Counsel! , Achievillg Effic iency ill Wa ter Allocatioll , above n l , 12 
143 Linco ln E nvironmental Water Allocation: A strateg ic overview, above n 3, as fo und in Counse l! , 
Achievillg Efficiency in Water Allocation , above n l , 12 
144 Counsel, Achieving Effic iency ill Water Allocation , above n l , 13- 14 with re ference to Linco ln 
Environmental, Water Allocation: A strateg ic OFerview, above n 3 
145 Counsel! , Achieving Ejjiciell cy ill Wa ter Allocation , above n l , 13 with re ference to Hawkes Bay 
Regio nal Counc il Regional Water Resources Plan (Napier, 2000) 
146 Lincoln En vironmental !nfo r111ation Oil Water Allocation in Nell' Zealand (Report No. 4375/ l , 
prepared for the Ministry fo r the Enviro nment, 2000) as fo und in Counse l! , Achieving Effic iency in 
Water Allocation , above n l , 13- 14 
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In respect of costs, councils will charge applicants with the processing costs 
for the consent. After the consent has been issued, an annual charge for monitoring 
by the council is due for payment, which normally is based on the amount of water 
extracted, for which water meters are used to determine the volume of the extracted 
water. 147 
VI PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULA TORY APPROACH 
REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE REGULATION 
The current approach of water allocation addresses a number of problems that 
were intensively discussed in the Water Programme of Action and several working 
papers of the Ministry of the Environment. In these, the experiences of participants 
of workshops and consultations were analyzed. 148 
A Lack of Planning - Better Guidance by National Government 
One point of criticism arose due the fact that up till now, only " [l]ittle 
strategic planning" 149 exists for water management as a whole. For instance, local 
councils are the dominant players at the moment. Their decisions can hardly be 
predicted and trans-regional projects become difficult. Besides, regional councils 
often do not receive guidance by the national government, which could support the 
councils in their - practically - independent decision-making process. Especially the 
industry is in favour of greater direction by central government and of giving them 
greater certainty. One example of this is to determine national important sites and 
values in the field of water management. 150 
In this area, the Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - which is even 
called "the biggest ' tune-up' of the RMA since 1991 " 151 - gave some relief. 
147 Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Warer Al/ocarion , above n 1, 14 
148 Compare: Ministry for the Environment Rejlecrions: A summary of your views on rhe Sustainable 
Warer Programme of Acrion (July 2005), above n 13, l 
149 Ministry for the Environment Waler Programme of Action, War er Allocarion and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 9 
150 Ministry for the Environment Rejlecrions: A s11111111ar,• of your ,·iews 011 rhe Sustainable Water 
Progra111111e of Acrion (July 2005), above n 13. 4-5 
151 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management A111end111ent Act 2005 - 0Fen1iew (August 
2005), found under the heading "Background" 
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These changes will not affect national policy statements in the field of the water 
industry so much, as the cunent discussions rather focus on other resources than 
water. 152 
Moreover, the role of the Minister for the Environment seems to have 
changed. Even before the RMA Amendment Act 2005 was released, the Minister had 
some powers in the field of water regulation. If he or she considered a resource 
consent to be a matter of national significance, he could call in an application. Once 
this application was called in, the Minister had to appoint a board of inquiry, which 
held a hearing and made proposals to the Minister, who then had to decide about the 
application , thereby replacing the decision of the local authority. 153 
The Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 makes available a wide 
range of more flexible and useful tools which widen the central government's 
influence, of which three examples shall be specified. 
Sections 140 and 141 (A) of the RMA now grant the Minister for the 
Environment the option to call in a subject-matter. If the Minister acts in this way, he 
or she can either hand over the application to a board of inquiry - a body of 
experienced people, chaired by a - current or former - Environment Court judge - or 
to the Environment Court. One of these instances then has to make a decision, which 
then can be appealed to the High Court, but only on questions of law. 154 
Apart from that, he or she can now directly interfere with the measures of 
local authorities. This starts with section 24 (A) RMA, which gives the Minister for 
the Environment the power to inquire into the performance of a local authority and to 
deliver futther recommendations to the local entity. For doing so, the Minister has a 
wide range of measures, sta11ing with requests for information (section 27 RMA), 
stretching to formal warnings to the local authority to take action and culminating in 
152 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving national 
leadership (August 2005), found under the heading "National Policy Statements" 
153 Ministry for the Environment Resource Manag ement Amendment Act 2005 - Improving national 
leadership (August 2005), above n 152, found under the heading "Decisions on matters of national 
significance" 
15
.i Ministry for the Environment Resource Management A111enc/111ent Act 2005 - Improving national 
leadership (August 2005), above n 152, found under the heading "Deci sions on matters of national 
significance" 
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the possible appointment of persons to substitute the function s of the local authority 
when it fulfil its tasks (section 25 RMA) .155 
Finally, section 25 (A) RMA enables the Minister to direct local entities to 
prepare plans or parts of them to deal with aspects of resource management. 
However, in doing this, the Minister cannot prescribe a defined outcome of the 
planning process. In contrast, the local entity still is accountable for the preparation 
of the plans. This tool is mainly a procedural stimulus to motivate local authorities to 
become active. 156 
All in all , these amendments are meant to give the Minister for the 
Environment limited powers to monitor the implementation of the RMA and to foster 
1-7 as well as compare council performance. ) 
The crucial point is , however, whether these extended powers of the Minister 
- especially his power to "call in" 158 - are an appropriate regulatory tool to improve 
the management of water resources . However, one has to consider that these 
ministerial powers will probably often play a major role in cases where bigger 
projects are involved and where the clash of differing interests is regarded sceptically 
by the media. This became obvious in the case of Project Aqua, where the special 
government panel and its intervention in the application process "aroused suspicion 
from irrigation proponents who fear[ed] the decision-making process [might have] 
favour[ed] Meridian over private local interests." 159 Public dissatisfaction was even 
increased as Meridian Energy is a state-held company. 160 
This practical example goes hand in hand with regulatory theory which says 
that one reason why regulatory agencies received an ever-greater importance at the 
cost of mini sterial powers was because it helped to keep political issues out of 
155 Ministry fo r the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving national 
leadership (August 2005), above n 152, fo und under the heading "Ministeri al powers" 
156 Ministry fo r the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving national 
leadership (August 2005), above n 152, fo und under the heading "Ministeri al powers" 
157 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving national 
leadership (August 2005), above n 152, fo und under the heading "Ministerial powers" 
158 Compare new section 141 RMA, amended in 2005, as fo und in Ministry fo r the E nvironment 
Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving national Leadership (August 2005), above n 
152, under the headin g: "Dec isions on matters of national signifi cance" 
159 "Troubled Water", above n 2 
160 ·Tro ubled Wate r", above n 2 
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regulatory issues. This enhanced continuity of planning-processes and contributed to 
greater fairness. Even pure "suspicions of political bias" 161 should be avoided in this 
context. 
Apart from that, the Minister will need feasible criteria when to interfere and 
when not. If he tends to interfere in everyday transactions, the capacities of the 
Ministerial Depaitment could be overstretched, especially due to the fact that it will 
perhaps lack the expertise necessary to deal with the issues. 162 
B Water Allocation - Problems of Efficiency 
Perhaps the major element that must be improved is the aspect of water 
allocation. The "first-in [,] first-served" 163 approach was in the focus of the debate, as 
such a method will not contribute to an efficient use of scarce water resources. 
Efficiency has - as the Environment Court said in Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v 
Marlborough District Council 164 - three dimensions, namely "allocative 
efficiency" 165 , "productive efficiency" 166 and "dynamic efficiency" 167 • "Productive 
efficiency" 168 means that a better product is generated with the same costs, for 
instance. "Allocative efficiency" 169 refers to the situation in which resources are 
guided to those production sites where the most valuable goods and services have 
their origin. 
161 Baldwin; Cave, above n 28, 69, with further reference to F.M.G. Willson "Ministries and Boards: 
Some Aspects of Administrative Development since 1832" (1955) Pub. Admin. 43 and to Baldwin 
Regulating the Airlines, chapter 7 
162 Baldwin; Cave, above n 28, 69 
163 Counsel, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 12, with further reference to Lincoln 
Environmental, Water Allocation: A strategic overview,above n 3 
164 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough District Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
165 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough District Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
166 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough District Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
167 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough District Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
168 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough District Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
169 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough District Council C 111/97, as found in 
Mc Le! Ian, above n 19, 21 
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"Dynamic or innovative efficiency" 170 means that technology changes are promoted 
and additional gains are some sort of market present for the pioneers responsible for 
them. 171 
The current regime of the RMA does not really provide methods that 
contribute to efficiency, as competition between different uses is not dealt with in an 
economic way. The RMA is mainly focused on the detrimental effects of use, 
therefore has a negative role, but does not positively provide in detail how water 
should be used in the most beneficial way. This becomes clear in the situation of 
Waitaki, when a water resource is nearly or fully allocated. Furthermore, even after a 
consent has been issued, few incentives exist for technical efficiency when making 
use of the consent. 172 
And the issue of efficiency continues with the aspect of payment for the good 
water. Although section 19 of the Local Government (Rating) Act 2002 enables local 
government to apply the principle of "the user pays", 173 which could contribute to 
efficiency, in practical terms most residential customers only pay a small, nearly 
invisible water charge as an element of their rates bill. Water metering and volume-
orientated charges are becoming more impottant, but are still an exception. 
All in all, the user has to cover the full capital and operational costs of the water 
supply which could contribute to sustainability, which is the maxim of the RMA. 174 
Hence, water is not allocated "to the highest environmental, social, cultural and 
economic value[ ... ]" 175 
The RMA Amendment Act 2005 sought to bring some relief to this problem. 
For instance, section 30 of the RMA has been amended in 2005, clarifying that it is 
the main function of the regional councils to set up rules in regional plans for the 
170 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. "Marlborough DistricE Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
17 1 Environment Court Marlborough Ridge Ltd. v Marlborough DisErict Council C 111/97, as found in 
McLellan, above n 19, 21 
172 Ministry for the Environment, Warer Programme of Action, Wafer Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 9-10 
173 Ralph Chapman; Eddy Goldberg; Guy Salmon; Jim Sinner Sustainable Development and 
Infra structure Report for the Ministry of Economic Development (2003) 88 
174 Chapman; Goldberg; Salmon; Sinner, above n 173. 88 
175 Ministry for the Environment Wmer Progra111111e of Action, Wmer Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 9 
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allocation of the natural resource water (and others). 176 However, the scope of 
regional plans is limited as further concrete guidance is not provided by the national 
government. 
Apart from that, sections 124 (A)-(C) RMA now provide that - once a 
resource consent has expired - the existing consent has priority in case of conflict 
with a new applicant for the same resource. Even though regional plans can 
implement exceptions from this "default rule", 177 it rather seems to be the case that 
the right of p1iority has been fixed 178 and therefore also the - often criticized - "first-
in [,] first-served" 179 approach. 
It is definitely a good starting-point when - as provided by section 124 (B) 
RMA - efficiency and the use of good industry practice on the one hand 180 and the 
value of existing investments (section 104 (A) RMA) on the other hand have to be 
considered 181 when deciding about an application. 
However, it seems to be the case that the status quo has been fixed rather than 
a flexible approach to water allocation having been chosen. The criteria for water 
allocation are wide and it is questionable whether these open terms give useful 
guidance. One can admit that this would be the case if a number of leading cases that 
might work as a pattern came into the focus of the authorities. Whether this will 
happen is very doubtful. 
A possible remedy for this, namely water transfers, do not play a major role 
in practical terms. Therefore, spare capacities have often not been transfeITed. One 
reason for this is that transfers must be permanent under the regime of the current 
176 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving natural 
resource allocation (August 2005), found under the heading "Clarification of regional council's role" 
177 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving natural 
resource allocation (August 2005), above n 176, found under the heading "Right in Priority" 
178 Giving an overview how the principle of priority still works in these cases: 
Ministry for the Environment Resource Management A111endment Act 2005 - Improving natural 
resource allocation (August 2005), above n 176, found under the heading "Right in priority" 
179 Counsel, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 12, with further reference to Lincoln 
Environmental, Water Allocation: A strategic overview,above n 3 
180 Ministry for the Environment Resource Manage111ent A111endment Act 2005 - Improving natural 
resource allocation (August 2005), above n 176, found under the heading "Right in priority" 
181 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - l111proving natural 
resource allocation (August 2005). above n 176, found under the heading "Recognition of the value 
of existing investment" 
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legislative framework and there is not an option available for a transfer to take place 
only for a limited period of time. Apart from that, partial transfers are not allowed. 
Finally, there is no provision in the RMA that the consent is re-transferred after a 
certain period of time. For that, a separate agreement would be necessary, which 
would be beyond the scope of the RMA. 182 
Although the Resource Management Amendment Act has been amended in 
section 137 in order to allow transfer of discharge permits, 183 there still seem to be 
deficiencies in the transfer system. 
The length of resource consents increases the difficulty, as some consents are 
concretely defined and last up to 35 years so that a re-allocation is hardly possible 
and transfers of water permits - up till now - hardly ever take place. Therefore, 
tension between certainty for industry when malang investments on the one hand and 
flexibility - on a national scope of allocating water to the most efficient uses - on the 
other hand - exists. 184 
C Maori Participation 
Another issue that was discussed is the Maori participation m allocation 
processes, which does not exist to a satisfactory degree. Maori place particular values 
in water and they should be protected. Section 6 of the RMA deals with the special 
relationship of Maori to water, calling it a matter of national importance. However, 
in practical terms, few opportunities to take part in management processes exist. 
Therefore, Maori would like to have a greater impact on these processes. 185 
The Resource Management Act 2005 tried to improve this status and to 
provide more clarity about the practical implications of consultation processes with 
Ma01i . This started with the implementation of a duty to keep records about certain 
182 Ministry for the E nvironment, Water Programme of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 10 
183 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving natural 
resource allocation (August 2005), above n 176, fo unding under the heading "Flexibility for transfer 
of water and di scharge permits" 
184 Ministry for the Environment, Water Prog ramme of Action, Water Allocation and Use. Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 11 
185 Mini stry for the Environment, Water Prog ramme of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 11 
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Maori groups, which means that each iwi authority has to be recorded and even 
groups of hapu must be listed when the hapu notifies the council. 186 
However, the scope of these reforms does not so much affect consultation 
processes in the framework of resource consent applications. Section 36 (A) RMA 
now points out that there is no duty to consult in these cases, unless such a duty 
exists under any other law or regulation. However, sometimes Maori groups will be 
affected parties and therefore have to be consulted in order to investigate the effect 
on tangata whenua and, furthermore, consultation at an early time of the application 
process "will often be good practice". 187 
The most important stage of consultation shall now take place at the level of 
preparing policy statements or plans. The new clause 3 A of the First Schedule of the 
RMA now generally 188 requires the councils to consider certain steps in the 
consultation process. Councils have to consider the ways of how to foster the 
capacities of iwi authorities to effectively exercise their rights , namely to build 
consultation capacities, to consult and identify special concerns of interest. 189 
An interesting tool that has been integrated into the RMA is the possibility of 
joint management agreements. Thereby, public and iwi authorities can enter into 
management agreements about natural or physical resources (sections 36 (B)-(E) 
RMA, as amended by the RMA Amendment Act 2005). The fact that the agreement 
can be terminated quickly, namely within 20 working days, notice, 190 makes clear 
186 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Acr 2005 - Improving certainty 
for consultation and iwi resource planning (August 2005), found under the head ing "Duty to keep 
records about iwi and hapu" 
187 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Acr 2005 - Impro ving certainty 
for consultation and iwi resource planning (August 2005). above n 186, foui:id under the heading 
"Consultation on resource consent applications and notices of requirement" 
188 An exception exists in clause 3 (B) of the RMA, as amended by the RMA Amendment Act 2005. 
The procedure described above is not compulsory if the same matter has already been subject to 
another consultation process between the same people under another Act within I year prior to the 
pub! ic notification of the proposed po! icy statement or plan. 
Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Acr 2005 - Improving certainty for 
consulration and iwi resource planning (August 2005), above n I 86, found under the heading 
"Consultation with iwi authorities" 
189 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendmem Acr 2005 - Improving certainty 
for consultation and iwi resource planning (August 2005), above n 186, found under the heading 
"Consultation with iwi authorities" 
190 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving certainty 
for consultation and iwi resource planning (August 2005), above n 186. fou nd under the heading 
"Joi nt management agreements" 
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that this clause is some sort of experimental provision , providing enough flexibility 
to leave the agreement if the cooperation fails in practical terms. 
The Mini stry for the Environment is currently undertaking further steps to 
improve the co-operation between iwi and the government, as well as the local and 
the national level. Measures are taken , including the promotion of pilot projects, 
environmental forums and assistance. 191 
However, these modifications mainly affect consultation processes but -
leaving the joint management agreements aside, which will probably not gain great 
importance - an institutionalized implementation of the Maori interest groups does 
not take place. However, in order to properly comply with the landmark case Mabo v 
Queensland, 192 further improvements are necessary. Theoretically, an effort 
comprising the institutionalized representation of Maori interests , even at a national 
level, would be desirable. However, this will probably not find broad acceptance and 
is therefore not feasible. 
D The Need for Good Regulation 
So far, the author has analyzed some major concerns and problems, relating 
to the current regulatory framework for water. The author of this paper proposes a 
good regulatory framework. This comprises two basic claims, namely that there is a 
need to regulate and that there is a need to regulate it better than up till now. 
Therefore, the decisive question at the start of the regulatory mix , proposed in 
this paper, now is whether - despite all the problems listed above - there really is a 
need for overcoming the status quo, a status where there seems to be reliance on an 
abundance of water resources 193 so that neither central government nor regional 
191 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 - Improving certainty 
for consultation and iwi resource planning (August 2005), above n 186, found under the heading 
"Building capac ity and promoting best practice" 
192 High Court o f Australia , (1992) Mabo v Q11ee11 sla11d (No. 2) 175 CLR l FC 92/014 (3 June 1992) 
This case can be accessed, among others, vi a 
<http ://www.austlii .edu .a u/au/cases/c th/HCA/ 1992/23 .html> (last accessed 10.02.06) and is also 
published in High Court of Australi a, Mabo v Queensland [1992] (No. 2) HCA 23 . 
193 Counsell , Achiel' ing Efficiency in Water Allocation , above n 1, 2 
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councils nor the institution of a market - I would call it a "quasi-regulator" - really 
operate as regulating forces in the pure sense of this expression. 
Theoretically, human beings act in a rational way. This ratio comprises a 
balancing of benefits with costs, the probability of certain events - under certain 
circumstances - playing a major role. 194 Therefore, applied to the subject-matter of 
this research paper, a reform towards a stronger regulation of water - especially of 
water aI1ocation - depends on the question whether the probable benefits of this 
outweigh the costs or risks. 
Put in other words, one has to ask the question what benefits and risks are 
involved if the current status quo is maintained. 
One benefit would be that one would rely on a permanent process of improvement in 
regional councils, so that these institutions gain more expertise and strive to make the 
best use of the potentials the current legal framework offers them. Practically, this 
means that councils develop better water plans, better regional policy statements and 
focus more on matters of efficient use. 195 
However, this evolution is very uncertain and central Government has hardly 
any influence on directing these processes. Availability of water will become a more 
and more important constraint of water management. Hence, the "first-in [,] first-
served"196 approach could become more and more apparent so that tensions increase. 
However, this seems to be a vicious circle, as this would give rise to barriers against 
water transfers, which are a sort of tools to overcome the current status. Moreover, 
regional councils could be forced to make use of claw-back arrangements or not to 
renew permits in order to protect environmental bottom lines. It is this risk of a 
vicious circle that seems to be the driving force to start with reform processes right 
now and not in some years, when problems might be more urgent. 197 
19
~ George P Fletcher; Steve Sheppard American Law in a Global Context The Basics (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 441 with reference to the "Learned Hand formula" and to United 
Stares v Carroll Towing Co (1947) 159 F2 d 169 (2d Cir) 
195 Ministry for the Environment, Water Progra111111e of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 13 
196 Counsel, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 12, with further reference to Lincoln 
Environmental, Water Allocation: A strategic overview, above n 3 
197 Ministry for the Environment, Water Progra111111e of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3. 13-14 
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Therefore, the short-term costs and the long-term benefits of a change in the 
regulation of water have to be compared and the potential long-term benefits (or, put 
in other words, the long-term potential harms to New Zealand's water resources) are 
the crucial argument for reform. These long-term costs comprise a loss of consumer 
confidence in the functioning of public water supply that could be irrevocably 
destroyed. Of course, the change comprises regulatory costs, caused by special 
training programs for regional councils or the implementation of market elements. 
However, benefits of change are an efficient system of water allocation, which deals 
carefully with the scarce resource so that even the "problematic" regions of New 
Zealand can reasonably master the problem of scarcity. 
The second issue is the principle of good regulation. Although some measures 
have been taken, whose benefits cannot be exactly predicted, but only preliminarily 
assessed, further steps have to be taken according to the view of the author of this 
paper. It is necessary to find new ways to allocate water more effectively in special 
regions of New Zealand, allowing efficiency, sustainability and Maori participation 
to be achieved properly. 198 
A good regulatory approach has to combine these values. The competing uses 
of water are best integrated into a strategic concept. Technical efficiency has to be 
ensured, adequate processes have to be provided to limit the amount of water 
extracted from the resources and processes governed by the maxims of fairness and 
equity have to be provided. It must also be ensured that a user cannot block the 
supply of water and harm his or her competitors. 
Allocation has to be consistent with water quality standards. Water should not be 
inappropriately polluted by users and health standards have to be regarded. 
Finally, greater certainty has to be provided for users so that investments are made 
and not postponed, meaning that processes have to be adaptable to changed needs. 
All in all, regulation has to manage all these conflicting requirements. 199 
198 Also see the main issues, as identified by Ministry for the Environment Report of the Sustainable 
Development, Water Programme of Action, Local Government Workshops (July 2005), above n 4, 5 
199 Ministry for the Environment, Water Progra111111e of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 12 
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VII MARKET APPROACH 
One solution for the problem of allocation in some areas at some times in 
New Zealand could be the introduction of markets in water rights. 
A Possible Advantages 
These markets could foster allocative efficiency, which is a state of 
distributed goods or rights in which any re-allocation could not improve the position 
of any person and - at the same time - not worsen his situation. Water could be 
transferred from a low value use to a higher one. Additionally, customers would also 
receive an incentive to sell unused water as they would receive a benefit for 
transferring it to others and not simply storing it. 200 
Furthermore, local regulation tends to have close links to its citizens so that 
political lobbyism in a local rather than national regulatory scheme is perhaps more 
likely. Even though the initial decision might be influenced by these political 
influences, tractable water rights could contribute to giving redress to them at second 
hand. 
These transfers could contribute to new investments, which are water intensive, as 
the transfers increase the probability that the investor will receive as much water as 
he or she needs for his or her project.20 1 
One theoretical model outlining the potential benefits was offered by Dr. 
Raffensperger of the Department of Management and Dr. Mark Wilke of the 
Department of Engineering, at the University of Canterbury, with the title "Forever 
Fair Fresh Water Trading System."202 
20° Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocatio11 , above n 1, 19 
20 1 Counsell , Achieving Effic iency in Warer Allocation , above n 1, 19 
202 Raffensperger; Mark Milke "Forever Fair Fresh Water Trading System", as fo und in Judith 
Petheram "Trading Water" (3 1 May 2005) The Nelson Mail (ed 2) 13ff. 
(note: onl y the first page was indica ted in the source the author used fo r hi s research paper) 
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In this model, it is proposed that water users have two options what to do with their 
water within one catchment: they can either retain it or trade with it, not the water, 
but the use of it being sold for defined time periods. 203 
This scenano could foster economic efficiency 204 and create "win-win 
situation [ s]. "205 
This can be easily illustrated by an example, given by Dr. Raffensberger. In it, there 
is a conflict between two water users. On the one hand, there is a tomato grower, 
who could increase his revenue by 50 $ if he or she receives another 10 cubic metres 
of water or - alternatively - lose a potential 50 $ by losing 10 cubic metres of water. 
On the other hand, a peach crop grower could earn an additional 30 $ by adding 10 
cubic metres of water (or losing it in the alternative situation). 
The solution for this dilemma would be for the tomato grower to buy the necessary 
10 cubic metres of water from the peach grower for 40 $ so that both make a profit of 
10 $ (and New Zealand makes 20 $). 206 
B Experiences in Australia 
At the moment, Australia is taking reform steps in the field of water. This 
process started in 1994, when the Council of Australian Governments created a 
framework for these measures at a national level. The basic elements were reforms in 
pricing (for instance usage-based pricing), water allocation (a systematic approach, 
where water licences were separated from land), a trading system for water licences 
and institutional reforms (separation of water service providers from regulatory 
· ) 207 agencies . 
203 Raffensperger; Mark Milke "Forever Fair Fresh Water Trading System'', as found in Petheram, 
above n 202, 13ff. 
204 Found in Petheram, above n 202, 13ff., obviously quoting Tasman District Council resource 
scientist Joseph Thomas, commenting on a trading system of water. 
205 Raffensperger commenting the "Forever Fair Fresh Water Trading System", as found in Petheram, 
above n 202, l 3ff. 
206 Raffensperger giving a practical example for the usefulness of the project "Forever Fair Fresh 
Water Trading System", as found in Petheram, above n 202, 13ff. 
207 Counsell , Methods for the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand. 
above n 8, 26-27 
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Australia's system is on its way to becoming "a mix of administrative and 
market-based methods."208 
The basis is an administrative process, where the responsible state or territory 
government issues a water licence. Water licenses are separated from the land and 
have a typical duration of 5 to 15 years. In order to acquire a water licence, the 
applicant has go through an administrative process, which involves "application, 
assessment and notification"209 similar to those in New Zealand, for instance. The 
framework is set by plans which define minimum water flows, rules for the re-
allocation in periods of low flows and principles for the trade of water licences. The 
plans also contain methods for consultation processes and provide additional 
information about the catchment, for instance about the question of when it will 
reach full allocation. 
After this allocation process, the trading of licences is possible, which was already 
the case before the reform process, however only in some states.210 
For instance, New South Wales had to face increased scarcity of water and 
there, more than 20 percent of allocated water rights were transferred from 1987 to 
1988. 
In this state, the regulators defined a maximum volume of available water. If there 
was more demand than offer, the entrants had to purchase existing water rights. 
Two types of water rights existed, normal and high security. The owners of the latter 
were normally given preference, whereas the first only received the rest of the water. 
It was also possible for irrigators to borrow some of the water allocated for the 
following year in the cun-ent year. This system has, all in all, contributed to a transfer 
from rather unproductive to more productive areas and increased efficiency in water 
211 use. 
Most regimes are heavily regulated, meanmg that transfers can only take 
place temporarily and only within the same supply system. Restrictions exist to 
208 Counsell, Methods for the Allocarion and Valuation of Warer Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 27 
209 Counsel I, Methods for the Allocation and Valuarion of Water Property Righrs in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 27 
21° Counsell, Methods for the Allocation and Valuation of Warer Property Rights in New Zealand, 
above n 8, 27 
211 CS First Boston NZ Limited (Principal author: Susan Begg) Reform of the Warer lndust,y (Final 
Report for the New Zealand Business Roundtable, August 1995) 3.3.15 
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mitigate hannful effects on third parties and the environment. Although in most 
regions only a small proportion of water was transfen-ed, there are particular states 
where this transfer system has worked successfully. 212 
There are definitely some obstacles in Australia. For instance, markets are 
regarded as thin , in respect of the number of trades ,213 and "'s leepers ' licences"2 14 -
licences that were up till now not used - might also exist, which could have negative 
consequences for the environment by way of increased extraction. 215 
However, all in all, markets are regarded to have brought some benefits for 
Australia, for instance the distribution of water from low value to high value uses. 216 
The water markets in Australia have become mature217 and they already contribute to 
efficiency, which is supported by the establishment of infonnation systems, such as 
brokerages. 218 
C A Model for New Zealand 
Increasing the possibility to transfer water rights or even establishing real 
water markets could be a solution to the problem of scarcity in some regions. In a 
survey conducted by Lincoln Environmental, the potential of this tool was widely 
acknowledged by private water users as well as regional councils. This was 
supplemented by the general willingness of regional councils to play an active part in 
h. 219 t 1s process. 
212 CS First Boston NZ Limited, above n 211, 3.3 .15 
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1 Objections of users 
There still are barriers to transfers in New Zealand. Water users said that only 
about 4 to 10 percent were willing to actually take part in transfers, although about 
75 percent saw a potential in this tool. 220 Water is sometimes regarded as "a gift of 
nature"22 1, which should not cost anything, regardless of the quantity consumed, the 
transportation costs or the purpose,222 so that it "belongs to everyone"223 and that the 
public should therefore control water services and "no one should be allowed to 
make a profit out of this activity". 224 Up till now, water transfers are rather seen as an 
ultimate possibility to "help each other out if there was unused water available" .225 
However, if this approach gave rise to a rather institutional arrangement, where a 
mere ecoconomic exchange "water for money" should take place, this was seen with 
discomfort due to the exceptional position money has in their view. Water commonly 
is regarded as a public good available to all people and not subject to markets. 226 
However, this view disregards the fact that water is also some sort of product, 
which is delivered by public entities that have to make investments in this field . The 
raw material water has to be collected, treated and delivered to the customer. A 
service task has to be fulfilled, which produces costs. In other words , water is far 
from being a free good. 
The notion of a public good could possibly also be an objection , raised to impede 
necessary change and to hinder possible higher prices. However, prices normally 
reflect scarcities. 
If no markets exist, increased costs must be covered. In public entities, this works by 
way of cross-subsidising. Other aspects of concern were practical issues in respect of 
infrastructure and the lack of storage options. All in all, water transfers normally 
require "a mature water economy"227 
220 Lincoln E nvironmental, Attitudes and Barriers to Water Transf er, above n 7 , 27 
22 1 Chapman; Goldberg; Salmo n; Sinner, above n 173, 89 
222 Chapman; Go ldberg; Salmon; Sinner, above n 173, 89-90 
223 Chapman; Goldberg; Salmon; Sinner, above n 173, 90 
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225 Lincoln Environme ntal, Attitudes and Barriers to Water Tran sfer, above n 7, 27 
226 Lincoln Environme ntal, Attitudes and Barriers to Wat er Tran sf er, above n 7 , 28-29 
227 R. Jones; W . Musgra ve; M. Brya n "W ater allocation and suppl y re liability in the Murrumbidgee 
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Up till now, this can obviously not be said about New Zealand. 
One of the barriers is the belief that water and land use should coincide and 
not be separated. It was generally seen that access to water is essential for land use 
and a transfer of water would reduce the value of the land. Therefore, selling water 
was regarded to be similar to selling the land itself.228 However, the clear separation 
between land and water rights has been detected as one important prerequisite for 
water markets, alongside with tradability between different uses and locations.229 
Another aspect that was detected in this survey is that water generally is not 
seen as a tradable good, meaning that one user relies upon its use and receives 
monetary compensation for this. A loss of water could reduce production, lower the 
earnings and will be harmful for existing contracts.230 
Apart from that, residents are even reluctant to changes in water use within 
their catchment and even between productive land uses. An increase of transfer could 
encourage larger corporate entities to become active, which could cause outsiders to 
become active on this market, too. Hence, a conservative attitude seems to be 
mingled with realistic worries in respect of social changes. 231 However, if a model 
such as the "Forever Fair Fresh Water Trading System" was applied, users would not 
have to take part in such a regime, as it provided only an "opt in and out" 232 
approach. 
One major and grave objection against water markets especially in the area of 
irrigation is that infrastructure is needed. However, there will always be some 
immobile elements of irrigations systems. Therefore, addressees of water transfers 
would have to pay not only for the use of water itself, but also for infrastructure. In 
order to cover investment costs, long-term transfers would be necessary, whereas the 
often sho1t-term transfers would not be sufficient to guarantee that. 233 
228 Lincoln Environmental, Attiwdes and Barriers to Water Transfer, above n 7, 28 
229 Cousell, Methods for the Allocation and Valuation of Water Property Rights in New Zealand , 
above n 8, 41 
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"Forever Fair Fresh Water Trading System" 
233 Lincoln Environmental , Attitudes and Barriers to Water Tramfer, above n 7, 28-29 
Finally, objections exist in respect of the features of possible markets. Due to 
New Zealand's regional structure, there might only be few market participants. Only 
few transfers would therefore occur each year. When one user gave up water, he or 
she could not be sure that water would be still available once he or she needed water 
again. Therefore, many users would be prone to retain their water for future needs. 
Temporary transfers would be hindered by the time-consuming administrative 
processes. With the growing scarcity of water, this problem would even increase in 
importance.234 
However, the trade of stored water could be a solution for these problems. Building 
capacities for storage means an investment in "a 'futures' interest." 235 This 
investment would yield a profit in times of scarcity and would contribute to water 
supply. Then, an approach similar to the "user pays" 236 principle would be 
followed. 237 
There are also uncertainties m respect of the clear ownership of water. It 
seems to be the case that water as a liquid good does not fall under the common 
categories of other goods, where exactly defined ownership is attached to the 
good.23s 
2 Barriers of regional councils 
Councils have to monitor and to assess the environmental effects of water 
use. For this, not only the individual effects of one water use, but also the cumulative 
consequences of water uses have to be taken into account. There is strict scrutiny 
before a consent is issued. Therefore, the current legal framework does not provide 
many opportunities for immediate and flexible transfers, which are legally doubtful. 
This is also why information is a key issues when granting transfers, which are often 
permitted on a case by case basis, which even increases uncertainty. As long as 
234 Lincoln Environmental, Attitudes and Barriers to Water Transfer, above n 7, 29 
235 Tasman district councilor Michael Higgins, as found in Petheram, above n 202, 13ff. 
236 Tasman district councilor Michael Higgins, as found in Petheram, above n 202, 13ff. 
m Tasman district councilor Michael Higgins, as found in Petheram, above n 202, l 3ff. 
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councils only allocate as much as they suppose people need, which 1s time-
consuming, water transfers are seen with reluctance. 239 
However, the system could define specific trading periods - for instance one 
week - in which the trade for a certain period could take place, which could foster 
the desired flexibilit/40 and could perhaps also reduce the work that has to be done 
by the councils. 
Finally, Councils often point to the fact that there is not a sophisticated 
mechanism of registering user interests in water. A waiting list might be helpful, but 
it would rather prolong the "first-in [,] first-served" 241 approach by other means. 
Better tools are not available and up till now, councils are not able to develop 
them. 242 
3 Evaluation 
There are definitely many attitudinal objections against water transfers which 
sometimes are based on valid arguments. Nevertheless, in many cases they just 
24~ reflect a mere fear of change ., that can be overcome by developing a legal 
framework and by the time factor. For instance, in the Ashburton-Lyndhurst 
Scheme,244 originally many residents opposed water transfers, which changed in the 
course of the years after their introduction. 
These could be accompanied by regional councils delive1ing consent conditions 
which enable fast and uncomplicated transfers. They could encourage and foster 
trade by flexible resource consents.245 
239 Lincoln Environmental, Attitudes and Barriers ro Water Transfer, above n 7, 30 
240 Petheram, above n 202, l 3ff., referring to the model proposed by Raffensperger; Mark Milke 
"Forever Fair Fresh Water Trading System" 
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242 Lincoln Environmental, Attitudes and Barriers ro Water Transfer, above n 7, 30 
243 Compare Lincoln Environmental, Aflitudes and Barriers to Warer Tramfer, above n 7, 28 
244 This scheme is situated in Canterburry, it has been operated since the 1940s by a company. The 
water users hold shares, allowing them to irrigate a defined region at a specific flow. Since the end of 
the 1990s, the company constitution enables to transfer shares to farmers who do not possess water. 
Up to December 2001. only one major and some small transfers have taken place. 
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Additionally, a fair demonstration about possible advantages of transfers 
could be made in order to deliver a message. This message would highlight the 
opportunity costs when water is not transferred to its best use and it would also make 
clear that water transfers actually work to distribute water to the users who really 
need it. 246 
What could foster acceptance in the population is the creation of a system of "checks 
and balances",247 where land owner retain certain amounts of extractable water and 
where democratically chosen and prescribed environmental bottom lines have to be 
regarded, such as minimum river flows. 248 
The market structure itself has some barriers that could be a major problem. 
For instance, an infrastructure problem exists, as it is often connected with high sunk 
costs. Apart from that, transfers over wide distances often are physically restricted.249 
However, there are some implementations that could be made to foster 
market mechanisms.250 
Up till now, no monetary incentive exists to transfer water from a regulatory 
viewpoint. A user who holds the water without making use of it is not charged for 
that. Therefore, a charge for the right as well as the use of water could stimulate 
competition. 251 
Furthermore, uncertainties have to be reduced, for instance by properly defining 
water resources and allocation limits by the Regional Council.252 
As the markets will possibly not be very large, it will be of utmost importance to 
provide information flows between the users. This could happen by means of 
middlemen - agents, for example - or even by means of user groups or web 
25 ~ trading. -' 
Unlike energy, water can be stored. Up till now, few storage capacities exist 
in New Zealand. They would, however, be of utmost importance. It contributes to 
246 Lincoln Environmental , Attitudes and Barriers to Water Transfer, above n 7 , 35 
247 Dr. Raffensberger, as found in Petheram, above n 202 , l 3ff. 
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47 
certainty as well as liquidity. It enables users to apparently estimate how much water 
is still available and it increases the confidence in the existing resources. It would 
also make it easier to transfer water from one place to another. 254 
Last but not least, regulatory barriers exist which could be overcome. It is of 
utmost importance that interests in water are properly registered so that the market 
participants can encounter each other. Especially, the system of consent to the 
individual water transfer is time-consuming and could be replaced by a consent to the 
idea of water transfers as such. This would make it possible that a consent is not 
necessary each time ex ante, but the effects of it could be assessed ex post. However, 
this would require a clarification of the legal provision of the RMA. 255 
D Conclusion 
There definitely is potential for the system of water transfer. Even though 
water users rather seem to prefer short-term transfer of water when water is 
abundant, permanent and long-term changes are seen with discomfort. This has to do 
with attitudinal barriers that can be overcome when users become aware of the 
practical and economical usefulness of the system of water transfers. A number of 
practical barriers exists, which can best be dealt with when each of them is tackled, if 
possible. For instance, the practical transportation problem and also the fact that 
water tights entail an element of uncertainty can be handled by making use of more 
storage capacities.256 
However, the idea of water markets will only be a tool in some areas and 
some regions of New Zealand. Up till now, no big market exists but a rather small 
number of water users are active. There will not be many transactions. However, 
good information tools and additional storage capacities can contribute to a better 
II · 257 a ocat1on system. 
In order to foster this idea, some amendments to the regulatory framework are 
mandatory. For instance, the notion that water is nearly free should be given up, 
25
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having in mind that it is a scarce resource. 258 Effective markets will require a 
functioning legal framework, properly defined water rights and the appropriate 
infrastructure for water trade. 259 
VIII PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
A The Need for Public Involvement 
The water sector needs involvement of government, and it is needed more 
than in other areas. 
Water is definitely different from other resources as it is "such a ubiquitous 
and vital part of nature, society and the economy"260 . Therefore, water has many 
elements of public good. In health-related aspects, public authorities will in many 
cases have a better understanding of consumers. However, in economical terms, to 
admit that water is generally open to a market approach and to private participation 
would enable a better analysis of water regulation. 261 
The author of this paper therefore argues that on the one hand, the potential of 
market elements should be acknowledged. On the other hand, public involvement is 
necessary. This is due to three major reasons. 
The most basic argument for public involvement is the character of the good 
"water". 
Water is essential for the conservation of life. Therefore, strong objections exist 
against too much private involvement in water supply. 262 
Apart from that, the supply of water has some elements of a natural monopoly. 
Normally, the supply of water relies on an underground network that often has been 
built at high costs. Hence, under economic considerations, it does not make sense to 
duplicate this structure. Therefore, the service provider normally has monopoly 
rights to deliver water for a specific area. However, regulators have to intervene in 
258 Lincoln Environmental, Attitudes and Barriers to Water Transfer, above n 7, 39 
259 Counsell, Achie,•ing Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 46 
26° Chapman; Goldberg; Salmon; Sinner, above n 173, 85 
26 1 The European Commission Community Research, above n 11 , 124-125 
262 The European Commission Community Research , above n 11 , 127 
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order to prevent the monopolist from abusing his market position. For instance, the 
provider could try to raise his profits, for instance by reducing costs - which could 
lead to bad water services. 263 Another related scenario could occur if certain areas are 
under-supplied, especially in parts where poorer parts of the population live, which 
can be explained by its "strong merit good characteristics".264 
Analysts have elaborated the water scenario. The market situation in respect 
of water - in contrast to other goods - is characterized by a reverse relationship 
between price and demand. This fact is called the low price elasticity of demand, the 
term price elasticity referring to the decrease in demand when prices rise, expressed 
in percentage. In respect of drinking water, the elasticity is close to zero as drinking 
water is essential for life and there is hardly any substitute.265 
Other sectors - such as industry and agriculture - demonstrate a more elastic slope as 
more alternatives for water are available. One could think of the introduction of 
water-saving production technologies or the change of production towards such 
products or crops that demand less water. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate 
between various sectors.266 
In respect of urban water supply, for instance, price elasticity is low.267 Therefore, 
any increase in tariffs will not result in big changes of consumers' behaviour. As a 
consequence, in the unregulated scenario the water monopolist could raise tariffs, as 
consumers will still pay for it. Efficiency, provided by a private market approach, 
and equity, provided by a regulatory approach, have to be harrnonised. 268 
263 BPD Water and Sanitation, BPD Water and Sanitation Cluster, The Interference between 
Regulatory Frameworks & Tri-Sector Partnerships, Annex A - Regulation in the Water Sector, 
<www.bpd-
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Water & Sanitation, London, April 2002), accessible via searching <www.bpd-
waterandsanitation.org> or - directly - via <www.bpd-
waterandsanitation.org/english/docs/regulation l .pdf> (last accessed 01.02.06) 
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Secondly, water has strong externalities which are related to health. Positive 
externalities exist in the way that clean water contributes to preventing water-borne 
diseases. Negative externalities can be detected, as water forms an integral part of a 
cycle and, for instance, it has to be cleaned before it is discharged back to 
environment.269 
The scope of externalities is even wider. For instance, over-abstraction in local entity 
may cause harm to other consumers, who might not have enough water left. That is 
why the public sector has to exercise its influence and to burden producers and -
indirectly - consumers with the social costs of this harmful behaviour.270 
Another limitation of the idea of markets is the information problem. 
Asymmetries of information exist between suppliers and customers. This does not 
correspond to the perfect market model, which states that all market participants have 
perfect knowledge of supply and demand. Although a perfect market will - anyway -
never exist in reality, the water market is perhaps further away from this ideal than 
markets for other goods. For instance, water producers often have a greater 
knowledge of the quality of water they deliver than their customers.271 
Bad water can make consumers ill but this will be realized only after the 
consumption, as consumers often do not have the necessary knowledge of the water 
quality. Even though a market participant will have some self-interest not to be 
involved in any scandals uncovered by the media, public involvement is essential. 
This has to take place by way of defining quality standards and by way of monitoring 
health-related issues. These problems have to be addressed by the public regulator. 272 
All in all, markets rather seem to be a supplementary element of regulation 
that should still rely on public regulation. 
269 The European Commission Community Research, above n 11, 126 
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B The Regulatory Framework 
According to regulatory theory, it is a crucial point to design an appropriate 
environment which contibutes to "the outcomes that society wants."273 In principal 
terms, one regulatory solution consists of creating incentives for politicians to foster 
quality regulation and implementing officials who execute these political decisions . 
In practical terms, however, indirect tools can be used that contain a number of 
. . I 274 pnnc1p es. 
This had to be coupled with "consistent and strong commitment from the 
highest political and administrative levels", 275 which can communicate a set of 
standards as to what is expected from individuals and organisations, and which 
should be backed up by "effective performance management systems".276 
Another crucial aspect is to provide the daily decision-makers with profound 
expertise so that they have the means to comply with the standards of good 
regulation. Hence, regulators must not only have the will, but also the abilities to 
perform well. 277 
Transparent regulatory processes are of equal importance. The public has to 
be well-informed about the issue as to what constitutes good performance. If the 
responsible regulators fail to do so, the responsible persons could come under 
pressure and might then have enough incentives to improve their regulatory 
output.278 
Finally, "follow-up"279 becomes relevant. The desired outcomes of regulation 
have to be compared with the factual performance in order to give adequate 
responses to "success or failure". 280 This can involve a number of measures, ranging 
273 Kevin Guerin Encouraging Quality Regulation: Th eories and Tools (New Zealand Treasury, 
Working Paper 03/24, Wellington, September 2003) 9 
274 Guerin, above n 273, 9 
275 Guerin, above n 273, 10 
276 Guerin , above n 273, 10 
277 Guerin , above n 273, 10 
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from information about regulatory performance, for instance by way of 
documentation, to "formal process reviews. "281 
This paper cannot discuss all possible options regulatory theory has to offer in 
order to comply with these principles. However, at least the basic question has to be 
answered whether management of water processes should rather take place at a 
national or at a local level. Definitely, a rather centralized approach would perhaps 
. d . f 282 H . I h prov1 e economies o scope. owever, creating a new regu atory agency, t e 
national level would also increase costs at first. Apart from that, the disadvantages of 
greater ministerial powers have already been discussed in this paper. 
Even though there are many chances for improvement at a local level, the 
benefits of a decentralized organisation of water management should not be 
underestimated. It may create closer links to the special conditions in the local 
communities, may contribute to a better monitoring and also provides easier access 
to relevant data about water projects.283 All in all, a proximity exists between water 
supply and consumption. 284 Apart from that, the decentralized regulatory structure 
also reflects the decentralized character of New Zealand's water resources that are 
unequally distributed throughout the country. 285 Central government will therefore 
perhaps have practical problems in organizing water allocation by way of a central 
department. 
Potential exists for a variety of improvements in this decentralized approach 
that should take into account the elements of a good regulatory scheme. 
This starts right with defining the characteristics of good regulatory 
outcomes. 286 In this context, economic efficiency of water use as well as equity 
should be identified as one major aspect of good regulation 287 - apart from good 
28 1 Guerin, above n 273, 10 
282Baldwin; Cave, above n 28, 66 
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water quality. 
288 
Regional councils often tend to consider efficiency only with 
respect to the individual user and not in respect of the resource water as a whole. 
Incumbent users of water often expect their consent to be renewed after expiry, 
considering the investments they have often made in water abstraction. 289 However, 
this existing practice290 does not take into account the notion of "[e]quity between 
existing and potential users". 291 The best allocation of water at a regional level 
cannot be achieved by doing so. In contrast, "the concept of water resources being 
used as a portfolio rather than being treated individually"292 seems to be the crucial 
issue in this context. A "strategic approach"293 is needed in order to find a balance 
between the different usages of water. A greater number of - more sophisticated -
regional plans could be useful in this context.294 
Up till now, one primary difficulty exists in this approach. Whereas national 
government can define "their preferred course of action", 295 local entities are 
accountable for the results from that guidance. Hence, it will be of crucial importance 
to give more concise "national direction on implementation of the RMA and its 
application to water allocation issues"296 and to remove local councils, for instance, 
out of the spotlight of public criticism to a certain degree, when introducing 
necessary - and perhaps unpopular - changes. 297 For instance, a publication of "best 
practice" 298 could contribute to significant improvements at this point and would 
satisfy the element of "commitment", 299 as stated above. 
After having defined these maJor goals of regulation, councils need the 
necessary expertise to introduce improved water management techniques. 300 As 
water allocation is a complex process, involving natural, social and economic issues, 
councils must receive sufficient input, at best by a small number of experts who are 
288 Compare BPD Water and Sanitation, above n, l 
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already active in some councils and should share their knowledge to multipy their 
expertise.
301 
In order to enhance public acceptance, stakeholders could also express 
their ideas and provide "strategic input",302 for instance by delivering Iwi documents 
or strategic papers. 303 
In order to satisfy the requirements of transparency and monitoring 
304 rf . d. 3os Id bi . h processes, pe orrnance m 1cators cou ena . e a comparat1 ve approac 
between the different councils,306 allowing the public to find the responsible entities 
for good - or bad - performance in certain regions of New Zealand. This approach 
could be assisted by more sophisticated monitoring processes. Up till now, councils 
rather focus on biophysical effects when reviewing their policies and leave aside 
other factors. 307 This competitive approach should be backed up by financial stimuli 
for the regional councils in order to ensure that there is a realistic incentive to get 
better. 
As a supplement of this comparative element, a better coordination 308 
between the local communities, especially in the field of water transfers between 
different catchments could be an invaluable tool to enhance the regulatory 
pe1iorrnance of the councils. In this context, a stronger reliance on market elements 
is not hindered by the sometimes purported character of water as a "local 
monopoly."309 Unlike other network sectors, water has often been delivered at a local 
level, which was also a consequence of high transportation costs. However, in 
Europe, there currently is a trend towards regional water service providers, partly 
d 1. . d. f d 100 km 310 Th. " . 1· . " 311 Id e 1venng water over 1stances o aroun . 1s reg10na 1sat10n cou 
therefore also be an argument for water markets in New Zealand that would also rely 
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on storage and transfer of water.., 
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All in all, the author of this papers argues for keeping the local structure of 
water allocation - with the preponderance on public regulators - and for giving 
greater assistance and also keeping control by the national government. 
IX MAORI PARTICIPATION 
Another issue that favours administrative regulators 1s the issue of Maori 
participation . 
A Legal Starting Point 
One major decision in respect of rights of indigenous people was Mabo v 
Queensland. 313 The High Court of Australia held that the notion of "terra nullius"3 14 
3 1-
can no longer be retained. ) 
"If it were permissible in past centuries to keep the common law in step with 
international law, it is imperative in today' s world that the common law 
should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial 
disciimination" .3 16 
This decision , where unjust discrimination was put to an end, where common 
Jaw was notably held to be pursuant to international Jaw and where the rights of 
indigenous people were strengthened,317 is not limited to the specific facts of this 
case, but must also have consequences for regulation in the context of New Zealand. 
313 Hi gh Court of Australia, ( 1992) Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) 175 CLR l FC 92/014 (3 June 1992) 
314 High Court of Australia , ( 1992) Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) 175 CLR l FC 92/014 (3 June I 992), 
Nr. 41 
315 The High Court o f Australi a al so contrasts thi s decision with a prior deci sion in re Southern 
Rhodesia [ 1919 J AC 2 11 , 233-234 
See High Court of Australi a, ( I 992) Mab o v Queensland (No. 2) 175 CLR I FC 92/0 I 4 (3 June 1992), 
Nr. 41 
316 High Court of Australia, (1992) Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) 175 CLR I FC 92/014 (3 June 1992), 
Nr. 41 
3 17 High Court of Australi a, ( 1992) Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) 175 CLR I FC 92/014 (3 June 1992), 
Nr. 42 
Al so compare the comments o f Martin Dixon; Robert McCorquodale Cases and Materials 0 11 
/memational Law (3ed, Blackstone Press Limited, London, 2000) 271 on thi s case. 
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Therefore, the legal approach demands to specifically consider the values of 
the Ma01i, as it is already stated in section 6 RMA. 
B Cultural Values of Maori 
However, in the last century, Maori had to experience that their values were 
disregarded and they saw a silent process of their principles being harmed. They had 
no proper representation in the important regulatory bodies. Therefore, they could 
not properly intervene but most often just complained that their relationship with 
freshwaters was disturbed, e.g. at the Waitangi Tribunals. Furthermore, the Pakeha 
practically did not attach high value to Maori culture. Although the RMA provides 
that the values of Maori should be integrated into the management of water 
resources, e.g. section 5, 6 (e), 7 (a) and 8 RMA, the view of Maori cannot only be 
expressed by western standards of economic and ecological terms. In contrast, the 
cultural values Maori attach to water demands a different approach. 3 18 
Maori have four central cultural features and principles which should be 
regarded in respect of water. 
Ma01i believe that all life, all natural elements of the earth - such as the forest and 
the waters - as well as natural phenomenona, e.g. wind and rocks - have an innate 
life-force, "mauii", 319 which is holy and must not be desecrated. Practically, this 
means that freshwater has to be protected in its integrity and threats to a cultural use 
of rivers for instance have to be limited as far as possible.320 
"Mahinga kai" 32 1 literally can be translated with "food works". 322 This wide term 
refers to the possibility to have access to a resource, to gather there as a group and to 
make use of it. This value is of utmost importance to Maori. 323
 
Thirdly, Maori believe that a continuum between the past, the now and the future 
exists. Today's tribes have to respect the former generations and have to leave our 
world in a good state to our successors. "Maori as kaitiaki"
324 have a duty to respect 
318 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 10, with reference - among others - to the Waitangi Tribunal Ngai 
Tahu Report (Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 1991) 
3 19 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 7 
320 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 7 
32 1 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14. 7 
322 Tipa; Teirney, above 11 14, 7 
323 Tipa; Teirny, above 11 14. 7 
324 Tipa ; Teirney, above 11 14. 8 
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this line of development, this bond between the times. Therefore, Maori also want to 
have influence in resource management bodies and relevant data on their values is an 
integral input of the decision-making process. This is also the underlying principle of 
section 7 (a) RMA. 325 
Last but not least, "Ki uta ki tai"326 is relevant. This term means that Maori have a 
view of the entire water circle which must not be artificially separated into its parts. 
A stream must be seen as originating in the mountains, passing through the land and 
mixing up with the sea at the end. 327 
Due to this spiritual link with the environment, Maori emphasise their wish to 
contribute their part to maintain certain freshwater sources in a good condition. Some 
water is considered to be "tapu"328 - that means sacred - and other sources may be 
held to be "taonga",329 which means to have a protected status.330 
C Tools 
One method to coITespond to the wishes of the Maori and to integrate them 
into the decision-making process is the "Cultural Health Index (CHI)"33 1 which gives 
one concrete example of how the cultural expertise of the Maori can be combined 
with western standards of management. 
The CHI consists of three elements, respectively traditional association, 
mahinga kai and stream health. 
The traditional association refers to historical significance of a site; here, it is also 
relevant whether Maori intend to visit this site or not. As a consequence, traditional 
places with few visits will not receive the importance of other sites, being a 
concession to practical feasibility of the complex approach of the CHI.
332 
325 Tipa; Teirny, above n 14, 8 
326 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 8 
327 Tipa; Teirny, above n 14, 8 
328 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 9 
329 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 9 
330 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14. 9 
33 1 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, l 
332 Tipa ; Teirney, above n 14, 27 
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The next aspect is "mahinga kai",333 which reflects the "mauri"334 of a waterway and 
its ability to support life diversity. This factor examines the abundance of species at a 
place, the possibility to have access to it and the belief of the Maori that they can 
make use of the site in the same way as in the past. 335 A score system for each of the 
sub-factors was applied. 336 
Finally, Maori had to judge the cultural stream health. 18 indicators existed, such as 
the overall stream health, the question whether water was safe to drink, the 
catchment scale, the riverbank condition, sediment, water quality in terms of 
pollution, smell and discolouration.337 
In respect of the question of whether a water complies with a drinking-water 
standard, a western standard might be defined as a state in which no or only non-
toxic contaminants exist so that some minor degradation is not regarded as 
detrimental. However, Maori would demand that drinking water has to be free from 
physical as well as spiritual pollution.338 
All in all, the CHI tries to measure and implement the Maori view of a good state of 
water management. 339 Cultural values of the Maori were combined with Western 
scientific techniques; the latter were used to mathematically attribute values to the 
different sites. Therefore, mutual respect and trust could be encouraged, whereby the 
common commitment to stream health was emphasised.
340 
333 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 27 
33
-1 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 27 
335 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 27, with reference to the Ministry for the Environment Environmental 
Pe1for111a11ce Indicators: Proposals for the Air, Freshwater and Land (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, 1997) 
336 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 28 
337 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 30-31 
338 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 27 with reference to the Ministry for the Environment Environmental 
Pe1for111a11ce /11dicators: Proposals for the Air, Freshwater and Lnnd (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, 1997) 
339 Compare Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 39 and 50 
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D Integration into Regulation 
The question 1s how these cultural values could best be integrated into a 
regulatory approach . 
Actually, two options are crucial , the first is an improvement of current processes, 
the other is making greater legislative changes in decision-making. 
A rather slight process consists of strengthening capacities for Maori, 
including funding and trading, to improve their management skills and to create more 
effective working relationships with local government. This could be assisted by a 
corresponding approach on the side of the councils that could be trained to develop a 
deeper understanding of Maori values and the implications as set by the Treaty of 
W · · 34 1 a1tang1. 
Another more fundamental approach that was proposed is to write down 
Ma01i involvement in planning processes into regional water plans , to give greater 
central government direction on this matter, to install ex-ante co-management of 
resources by amending the RMA (in sections 33 and 34 for instance) or to create an 
ex-post monito1ing process. This last aspect could be made by way of Local 
Government Act audits or by an Ombudsman process.
342 
The author of this paper argues that a pure market approach will often 
discriminate against minority groups, whose words are not heard. Therefore, 
governmental regulation is necessary, an improvement of Maori participation at the 
local level being desirable and a good step in the right direction. It is essential that 
Maori values are heard, communicated to Pakeha and that both groups can jointly 
work on one common goal , namely to protect the unique values of Maori. 
It is a crucial point in which way regulation should contribute to these effo1ts. 
One theoretical option would be an agency3.n for the protection of Maori values. This 
agency could consist equally of Maori and Pakeha water experts . Both should be 
34 1 Ministery for the Environment, Water Programs of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004 ), above n 3, 17 
342 Ministery for the Environment, Water Programs of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 18 
343 Compare in general terms in respect o f the agency so lution: Bald win ; Cave, above n 28. 69-70 
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specially trained in order to develop a mutual understanding for Maori values as well 
as water implications. 
Maori could define a certain amount of the most valuable water resources which are 
regularly monitored and which could have certain, but not boundless competences to 
delay a water transfer by way of veto . 
Such a veto could be the beginning of a strict scrutiny of the water transfer that could 
be undertaken by this independent agency. If the independent agency, after this 
process, still maintains its position, the water transfer could be subject to a final 
decision by an Ombudsman, as mentioned above. 
Such a process would make it possible to bundle expertise and to work independently 
from governmental politics and would therefore save costs, compared to an approach 
in which these agencies are installed at a local level.344 
However, as it was said, greater Maori participation could create "a 
perception of special treatment". 345 Therefore, it is necessary to foster open 
communicative processes between all stakeholders. 346 It will also be necessary to 
inform the public about Maori values so that it can understand the special importance 
water has for them. 
All in all , the agency-option mentioned above will - m the short run -
probably not receive enough support by the New Zealanders as a whole. Maori 
would perhaps be in the spotlight of public scrutiny,347 which the author of this paper 
would also count as a regulatory cost in a wider sense, impeding an effective 
protection by way of this regulatory agency. 
Therefore, the realistic alternative for creating such an agency would be to 
institutionalize communication processes between Pakeha and Maori and implement 
slight changes in regulatory processes. Government could fund projects where 
special Maori values are integrated into Western standards
348 and could also aim for 
34
~ Baldwin ; Cave, above n 28, 69-70 
345 Mini stery for the Environment, Water Programs of Action, Water Af/ocation and Use, Technical 
Workin g Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 18 
346 Ministery for the Environment, Water Prog rams of Action , Water Aflocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 18 
347 Ministery for the Environment, Water Programs of Action, Water Allocmion and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3, 18 
348 Tipa; Teirney, above n 14, 50 
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a better mutual understanding by workshops for local regulators.
349 A further step in 
the right direction could be an effort that tries to institutionalize these working 
groups as permanent entities, which could improve the implementation of Maori 
values in the long run. 
X CONCLUSION 
The author is convinced that the best regulatory mix will comprise a number 
of different, probably rather slight changes in regulatory structures. These changes 
should affect market elements, changes in public involvement and also in the issue of 
Maori values. 
The ideal regulation of water in New Zealand will not be a decision in favour 
of one special regulatory theory, but a combination and an integrated approach of 
several theories. There is the question as to what extent certain elements shall prevail 
at the expense of others. This requires a basic decision whether to rely on 
competition or not.350 The author of this paper argues in favour of market elements, 
which shall be strengthened where possible. 
This is caused by the fact that, if water 1s merely declared a public good, 
responsibility for it is lost. No incentive exists to conserve this valuable good. Water 
information campaigns may contribute to a better understanding; however, human 
beings need concrete incentives to deal carefully with scare resources. Therefore, 
efficient use of water requires some sort of market elements, and the most basic of 
them is that it has to be paid for.
351 
This insight is lost when too much emphasis is laid on public involvement. Instead of 
the concept of "equal suffering", 352 New Zealand should provide an innovative 
approach including market elements. 
However, as in practical terms markets will only be a supplementary, but 
essential element of regulation, administrative processes have to be improved. This is 
due to the fact that water is a very special good that is essential for human life and 
3~9 Ministery for the Environment, Water Programs of Action, Water Allocation and Use, Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004), above n 3. 17 
35° Compare Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation. above n 1, 25-26 
351 Tren, above n 23 
352 Dr. Raffensberger, as found in Petheram, above n 202, l 3ff. 
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which needs public involvement, 353 especially when water quality standards are 
concemed. 3
54 The basic question whether to rely on local or rather national regulators 
should be answered in favour of local entities. 355 What has become clear is, however, 
that they need better guidance by the national govemment. 356 Here, the ministerial-
call-in approach will not be a panacea. As it will mainly be applied in highly 
politicized cases, where factual or purported lobbyism could play a major role, it 
does not seem to be the appropriate regulatory solution. National Guidance should 
rather be provided in a non-case-specific way, for instance in prescribing allocation 
principles or perhaps also in forcing councils to release allocation plans. 
357 The 
principle of efficiency is, as said above, of vital importance to New Zealand's long-
term supply of water for different usages and this principle will only be applied by 
market elements358 - in some parts - or by improved administrative processes. 
This starts right with the notion of "[e]quity between existing and potential users",
359 
which requires a "strategic approach"360 in order to get further away from the "first-
in [,] first-served" 361 approach. For doing so, more guidance by the national 
government is necessary,362 for instance by guidelines of "best practice".
363 In order 
to achieve a more sophisticated allocation of scare water resources, further 
communication processes between water experts, sitting in some councils, and other 
regulators should be enhanced. 364 Finally, performance indicators,
365 i.e. an increased 
control of local regulators, will be necessary and could provide further 
. 366 improvements. 
353 The European Commission Community Research, above n 11, 127 
354 BPD Water and Sanitation, above n, l 
355 Compare in general terms in respect of the benefits of decentralized regulation: Worldbank, above 
n 12, Annex 2, 3rd page, found under the heading "How decentralized should regulation be?" 
356 Ministry for the Environment Reflections: A summary of your views on the Sustainable Water 
Programme of Action (July 2005), above n 13, 4-5 
357 Arguing in favor of "a more strategic approach" 
Lincoln Environmental Water Allocation: A strategic overview, above n 3, 14 
358 Compare in respect of an improved trading - model: Counsell, Achieving Efficiency in Water 
Allocation, above n 1, 18-19 
359 Lincoln Environmental Water Allocation: A strategic oven,iew, above n 3, 9 
360 Lincoln Environmental Water Allocation: A strategic overview, above n 3, 14 
361 Counsel I, Achieving Efficiency in Water Allocation, above n 1, 12, with further reference to 
Lincoln Environmental Water Allocation: A strategic overview. above n 3 
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All in all, the preponderance of administrative regulators is also justified by 
the fact that Maori values have to be protected better. It would be unrealistic to rely 
on markets in this aspect. In contrast, institutionalized communication processes 
between Pakeha and Maori will contribute to a better regulation of water. 
367 First 
steps in this directions have been undertaken by the national government; however, 
potential for improvement still remains . One is to implement permanent panels, 
consisting of Pakeha and Maori, that could implement Maori values in the long run. 
It will be the task of New Zealanders to adopt an innovative approach to 
competing water interests . Neither a pure market nor a pure administrative process 
will contribute to long-term sustainability. Moreover, the regulatory scheme will 
comprise different elements. Changes should be made at a relatively early stage, 
before public confidence in the existing regulatory framework is lost or reduced. The 
desired combined effort can be visualized by a regulatory milkshake or some sort of 
cocoa, with a preponderance of local regulators (= the milk), added by some market 
elements (= a little cocoa) and also better guidance of national government (= the 
sugar). 368 The author is convinced that the consumers will find that this milkshake 
tastes better than the current approach. 
367 Compare - in respect of one concrete project: Tipa; Teirny, above n 14, 50 
368 Actually, the idea of milk shakes or some sort of cocoa in a regulatory context is analogous to a 
regulatory problem in the Netherlands in the 1990s. This - or at least a similar - metaphor was applied 
- as far as the author remembers - to the Dutch tabor market, as reported in a German News Program 
(maybe the ·'heute-journal,. on "'ZDF") in the second half of the 1990s. German media then contrasted 
the German regulatory scheme with the dutch one, and the later was seen as a good example for 
innovative regulation. 
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